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Chapter 1   Introduction 
In a shopping center (SC), there are a developer and retailers. A developer attracts 
retailers to an SC, while retailers make a tenant contract with a developer. Since an SC 
has a key feature as a commercial agglomeration that retail tenants are placed side by 
side, there is competition among the retailers to attract customers. Thus, it is important 
to consider the degree of competition in an SC. Moreover, the profits of developers 
may be affected depending on whether similar retailers sell similar products or 
differentiated products in the SC. In reality, exactly the same retailers never exist in one 
SC and hence, by considering the situation where an SC has various retail tenants 
selling differentiated products, we can make our model closer to reality. Therefore, it 
is important to consider the degree of competition among retailers. Furthermore, for 
the tenant contracts of retail companies in SCs, the rent system plays an important role 
in the overall optimization strategy of the SC. In other words, the rent system in SCs is 
an important problem for the developer because the developer gains a great profit by 
charging rent to the retailers. That is, a rent system can have a significant effect on the 
profit of the developer. 
Although the sizes of retailers vary across companies, for simplicity, we categorize 
companies into two types: large retailers (e.g., UNIQLO, ZARA, H&M etc.) and small 
retailers. In particular, we investigate whether a developer gives preferential treatment 
to either large or small retailers by assigning a higher percentage of the royalty rent or 
fixed fee rent to large or small retailers. Previous studies have also analyzed this 
problem and discussed the rent system of SCs (Benjamin et al. 1990, 1992; Brueckner 
1993; Chun et al. 2001, 2003; Colwell and Munneke 1998; Gatzlaff et al. 1994; Gerbich 
1998; Gould et al. 2005; Pashigian and Gould 1998; Wheaton 2000) and two-part tariff 
consisting of the royalty and fixed fee (Faulí-Oller and Sandonís 2002; Gallini and 
Winter 1985; Griva and Vettas 2015; Kamien and Tauman 2002; Katz and Shapiro 
1985; Kitagawa et al. 2014; Mukherjee and Balasubramanian 2001; Niu 2013; Saggi 
and Vettas 2002; Martín and Saracho 2010, 2015, 2016; Wang 1998, 2000; Wang and 
Yang 1999).
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In the rent system of ad valorem royalties (revenue sharing royalties), the rent 
depends on the sales of retailers. Meanwhile, in the rent system of per unit royalties, 
the rent depends on the volume of sales. An example of the latter agreement is a 
percentage rent. In fact, ad valorem royalties and fixed fee rents are relatively 
commonly used in rent contracts in SCs. In Japan, according to the Annual Report of 
AEON Mall in 2016, the basic operating revenue of AEON Mall as a developer comes 
from real estate rents consisting of the fixed fee rent and royalty rent. Moreover, the 
revenue structure of AEON Mall in fiscal year 2015 was that 53.2% of the revenue 
came from the fixed fee rent, while the commission revenue of the royalty rent was 
46.8%. The annual report mentioned that the royalty rent is decided by the sales of 
retail tenants. The revenue of AEON Mall as the developer would increase as the sales 
of retail tenants in SCs rise. Therefore, in the research field of SCs, it is important to 
consider not only one type of rent contract but also the rent types combined with the 
fixed fee rent and royalty rent to consider the revenue sharing royalty rent according to 
sales of the retail tenants in SCs. 
Nonetheless, in supply chain management (SCM) research, researchers have not 
necessarily used ad valorem royalty rents, fixed fee rents, and two-part tariffs (ad 
valorem royalties plus fixed fee rents), rather preferring a rent system comprising per 
unit royalties, fixed fee rents, and two-part tariffs (per unit royalties plus fixed fee rents). 
In other words, in previous studies, despite its importance, the ad valorem royalty with 
two-part tariffs has received less attention, especially compared with the rent system of 
the per unit royalty (e.g., Heywood et al. 2014; Martín and Saracho 2016). Therefore, 
we conducted research to bridge this gap between reality and the research field. By 
using a model of the optimal two-part tariff licensing between a developer and two 
asymmetric retailers as the base model, we focus on the effect of the demand 
uncertainty situation as the extended model. 
We explain the assumption of the extended model. In reality, many retailers selling 
many kinds of products in SCs have a plenty of information about customers. 
Specifically, we assume that the retailers in SCs accumulate a lot of knowledge and 
information about customers, such as the number of customers to come into the retail 
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store, the general number of products they can sell by month, and what kinds of needs 
customers in SCs have. In practice, this means that retailers know customer demand. 
That is, at the stage of selling products, we assume that large and small retailers know 
customer demand in a retail store and compete on quantity. On the contrary, since the 
developer does not have information about the customer demand of each retailer at the 
stage of making a contract, it is faced with the situation of knowing customer demand 
probabilistically. In this paper, we build the extended model by considering the 
situation that customer demand in SCs is uncertain. 
In this paper, we focus on comparing royalty licensing with fixed fee licensing, 
which is one of the themes dealt with in previous studies. Many papers have examined 
the impact of licensing on innovation (Gallini and Winter 1985; Grossman and Shapiro 
1987; Kamien and Tauman 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1985). Combinations of the fixed 
fee rent and ad valorem royalty rent are most often observed in practice. In our model, 
we develop a theoretical model by applying the accumulation of these previous studies 
to the method of collecting the tenant rents of retailers in SCs. Some classic studies are 
only concerned with one form of licensing, either fixed fees or royalties (Gallini and 
Winter 1985; Grossman and Shapiro 1987; Katz and Shapiro 1985). Specifically, 
Gallini and Winter (1985) considered only a royalty contract. On the contrary, Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) considered only a fixed fee contract. While licensing by means of a 
royalty is more prevalent than licensing by means of a fixed fee, Kamien and Tauman 
(1986) showed that a fixed fee is superior to a royalty for both inventors and consumers. 
In this way, a major finding of the classic literature is that licensing by means of a fixed 
fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty. However, this analysis considered a 
license to companies that are not competitors. In the case of a license to companies that 
are competitors, past research shows a greater profit for licensing by means of a royalty 
than licensing by means of a fixed fee. In this way, previous studies have focused on 
the conditions under which the relationship among profit, consumer surplus, producer 
surplus, and social welfare in the equilibrium is reversed by comparing royalties with 
fixed fees and judging which system works better for the revenue of the licensing 
company. 
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In this paper, we adopt a model of the two-part tariff based on the ad valorem 
royalty for this problem. Such a treatment by the optimal two-part tariff licensing is 
also used in Martín and Saracho (2016). Moreover, we analyze and examine changes 
in the equilibrium when market competition gradually becomes intense and approaches 
the competition of homogeneous products using the degree of product substitutability. 
In the model of horizontal product differentiation, since we can examine to what extent 
the degree of competition may change under certain parameters, we can also discuss 
changes in the conditions in the equilibrium by the comparative statics using this 
parameter. Research on product differentiation has been carried out in both the 
economics and marketing fields (Lancaster 1990; Ratchford 1990). Research in 
economics and marketing has insisted on the importance of horizontal product 
differentiation with competition among firms (Brown 1989; d’Aspremont et al. 1979; 
Ebina et al. 2015; Lancaster 1990). 
This paper considers a vertical relationship in SCs with a developer and two 
different types of retailers: a large retailer and small retailer. First, a developer decides 
the royalty and fixed fee rent for each retailer. Then, each retailer decides the sales 
volume in SCs. There are two types of rent payments: one type is a fixed fee rent for a 
certain period of time and the other type is a rent determined by the sales of the retailer. 
In our model, a developer determines which rent payments will be assigned. When 
there are both large retailers and small retailers in one SC, the developer may attempt 
to make the competitive advantage of the small retailer stronger by improving the 
quantity of products and intensifying the competition between large and small retailers 
in the SC. However, in our model, the developer gives preferential treatment to large 
retailers rather than intensifying competition among retailers by strengthening the 
competitive advantage of the small retailer at the equilibrium. In other words, we find 
that the developer chooses an action to make the large retailer even stronger and 
increase the sales volume of the large retailer by decreasing the royalty of the rent of 
the large retailer to increase the profits of the developer. Then, the developer collects 
the rents with a greater ratio of the fixed fee rent from the large retailer and the rents 
with a greater ratio of the ad valorem royalty rent from the small retailer in SCs. 
 5 
 
Therefore, we explain the observed relationship in real-world SCs by using our 
theoretical model. 
Furthermore, in our extended model, we reveal the surprising phenomenon that 
this conclusion would be reversed in the situation with demand uncertainty. Specifically, 
although we find that the proportion of the fixed fee rent is higher for large retailers 
than small retailers in our benchmark model, the extended model shows that the 
proportion of the fixed fee rent becomes greater for small retailers. Moreover, regarding 
important factors such as the relation of the fixed fee rent between large and small 
retailers, we find that one region is reversed. In this way, we find that the benchmarks 
and results change with a simple comparison. Moreover, in our model, when the degree 
of demand uncertainty is the same in each retailer, we find that the result is consistent 
with the benchmark model. In other words, we find that the fixed fee rent increases 
only if a factor widens the difference in the degree of demand uncertainty between the 
large retailer and the small retailer. 
In addition, under demand uncertainty, we find that when the demand uncertainty 
in the whole SC increases and market competition gradually becomes intense and 
approaches the competition of homogeneous products using the degree of product 
substitutability, the developer would increase the proportion of the fixed fee rent for 
both large and small retailers. Our analysis in the benchmark model confirms that large 
and small retailers have a contrasting movement with respect to the proportion of the 
rent at the equilibrium. However, in the situation where the extent of the demand 
uncertainty of both retailers increases, we find that both large and small retailers take 
the same action in terms of the fixed fee rent of retailers at the equilibrium. 
Furthermore, by using the comparative static analysis, we analyze what would 
happen when differentiated products become homogeneous products and the 
competition between retailers becomes more intense in SCs. Then, if the retailers in 
SCs become even more competitive, it could decrease the profit of the developer. This 
is confirmed by using a benchmark model that the profit of the developer would decline 
as previously when approaching homogeneous products, it reduces the profit of the 
developer at the equilibrium. This is a general result. However, in our extended model, 
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we discover a counterintuitive result that the profit of the developer would increase 
under uncertainty in SCs. In other words, when the degree of product substitutability 
increases and similar retail tenants carry similar products in an SC, there is an increase 
in the profit of the developer. Then, amazingly, when the degree of demand uncertainty 
in the whole SC increases, the profit of the developer increases more at the equilibrium. 
Furthermore, we obtain similar results for social welfare under uncertainty at the 
equilibrium. This is one of the most interesting results in our extended model. In other 
words, we find that increasing demand uncertainty for the whole SC is desirable for the 
developer in our model. 
The contribution of this research is that we clarify the relationship among the 
variables that can be observed in reality in an SC by using the theoretical model. In 
addition, we obtain theoretical evidence that demonstrates the findings from previous 
empirical studies. In previous studies, the developer gives preferential treatment to 
large retailers (Benjamin et al. 1992; Brueckner 1993; Eppli and Shilling 1996; Gould 
et al. 2005; Miceli et al. 1998; Pashigian and Gould 1998; Wheaton 2000). Much of 
this previous literature has focused on the rent system of the per unit royalty and hence 
studies of the ad valorem royalty with two-part tariffs have received relatively less 
attention. The result of our paper is novel for building a theoretical model using revenue 
sharing, called the ad valorem royalty rent system, which is commonly used in practice 
in SCs. 
Furthermore, in the context of SCs, prior research has paid insufficient attention 
to the theoretical relationship between the proportion of the two rent systems (ad 
valorem royalty and fixed fee rent) for large and small retailers and the profits of 
developers. In addition, insufficient discussion has been carried out on the changes in 
the proportion of the fixed fee rent and ad valorem royalty rent between large and small 
retailers and in the profits of developers by considering the degree of product 
substitutability and demand uncertainty in the context of SCs. Additionally, no 
argument has been made on the degree of the difference in uncertainty between two 
types of retailers at the same time. Therefore, this paper can explain the observed 
relationship in reality by using factors not used in previous studies. This paper 
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contributes by pointing out the importance of considering competitive relations due to 
the change in the degree of product substitutability between large and small retailers 
and of considering the uncertainty of customer demand faced in SCs in the real world. 
Interestingly, our analysis shows that when demand uncertainty is expanded in 
SCs, that is, when a developer attracts a retailer with a high degree of demand 
uncertainty such as opening a new tenant or rolling out new products, selling a new 
product for new customers in SCs, it would be better for the developer to increase the 
proportion of the fixed fee rent. Moreover, from a managerial perspective, we find that 
a developer should attract a retailer with the demand uncertainty in the whole SC and 
similar retail tenants such as those that sell similar quality products to the SC. 
Furthermore, this paper makes a major contribution to the better management of SCs 
by indicating that when a developer opens an SC in areas where demand uncertainty is 
relatively high, it may be profitable for developers to attract retailers producing a 
similar product to other retailers, having a similar consumer need, and selling a product 
that has a similar quality or value. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we show 
the related literature. In Chapter 3, we investigate the ad valorem royalty plus fixed fee 
model as the benchmark model. Chapter 4 focuses on the ad valorem royalty plus fixed 
fee model with demand uncertainty as the extended model. Chapter 5 shows the key 
ﬁndings and concludes the paper by providing directions for further research. 
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Chapter 2   Related literature 
 
2.1. Literature on SCs 
 
Over previous decades, SCs have been studied from a variety of perspectives. Several 
studies have discussed the determinants of rent in an SC (Benjamin et al. 1990, 1992; 
Des Rosiers et al. 2002; Gatzlaff et al. 1994; Hardin et al. 2002; Mejia and Benjamin 
2002). The literature on SCs has mainly evolved around the concepts of agglomeration 
economies and externalities derived from the presence of a large retailer (Eppli and 
Benjamin 1994; Mejia and Benjamin 2002; Pashigian and Gould 1998), whose 
bargaining power results in it negotiating a lower rent with the developer in an SC. 
Hence, few studies have addressed the problem comprehensively and focused on how 
the relationships among the degree of product substitutability and differences in the 
rent system of large and small retailers affect the profit of the developer in an SC. We 
also analyze the rent system of retailers from the point of uncertainty in the model. 
Therefore, we clarify the causal relationship among these various variables, which has 
not been considered in previous studies. Meanwhile, since the terms used in previous 
studies vary, we unify the terms used herein. 
First, we provide an overview of the rent problem in an SC. Some previous 
research presents the problem in relation to the rent of an SC (Benjamin et al. 1990, 
1992; Brueckner 1993; Chun et al. 2001, 2003; Colwell and Munneke 1998; Des 
Rosiers et al. 2005; Gatzlaff et al. 1994; Gould et al. 2005; Hartzell et al. 1987; 
Pashigian and Gould 1998; Wheaton 2000). We provide the first full-scale analysis of 
the rents in an SC. Benjamin et al. (1992) examined rents for retailers in an SC based 
on homogeneous retail tenant space. They found price discrimination to the extent that 
the variance in rent for retailers attributable to differences in contractual information 
can be explained by differences in the characteristics of retail tenants. Therefore, they 
showed that the characteristics of retail tenants are indeed important for explaining the 
variance in rent. They also showed that a number of other factors might be important 
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for determining base rents, which are negatively related to percentage rates and 
positively related to the sales of retail tenants. In recent studies dealing with the degree 
to which the characteristics of retailers influence the use of percentage retailer contracts 
with a developer, Chun et al. (2003) dealt with the problem of risk sharing between a 
developer and retailers from an accounting perspective. In this way, previous studies 
have shown that the approach to rent determination in an SC is important. 
Second, in theoretical studies, some researchers focus on the tenant placement of 
SCs (Brueckner 1993; Miceli et al. 1998). We review the retail tenant mix and space 
allocation in an SC. These papers have acknowledged the important role played by the 
developer in SCs in determining the tenant placement and competitive success of 
planned SCs. In recent years, how SCs should be built and survive has become a topic 
of academic research. For example, the choice of retail tenant mix by the developer in 
SCs was analyzed by Brown (1992). The theoretical foundation is based on previous 
models of space allocation in an SC (Brueckner 1993; Eppli and Benjamin 1994). Eppli 
and Benjamin (1994) developed a stylized model with a large retailer and a small 
retailer. Brueckner (1993) analyzed the problem of the optimal space allocation in an 
SC in the presence of externalities among retailers. In this model, the sales of retail 
tenants depend on their own space as well as on the space allocated to other retail 
tenants in an SC. The sales of retail tenants rise as other retail tenants expand since the 
SC becomes more attractive to customers. They also developed a model of space 
allocation between a large retailer and a small retailer for SCs with externalities among 
retailers. Taking this externality into account, a developer allocates space to various 
retail tenants to maximize the profit of SCs. The solution to this problem has been 
analyzed under a number of behavioral assumptions. 
Brueckner (1993) explained why large retailers that have higher externality 
generating ability have a larger space in SCs than other retail tenants. Miceli et al. 
(1998) explained theoretically why a profit-maximizing developer might include 
multiple and competing retail tenants in an SC and also explained the implications for 
tenant mix. They also provided a theoretical analysis of this problem in SCs and 
concluded by explicitly relating the analysis to the model of Brueckner (1993) of 
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optimal space allocation in an SC. They insisted on the role played by demand 
externalities when the developer determines the space size that types of retailers should 
be allocated in SCs. However, their analysis did not show where a store should be 
located in the presence of demand externalities. Vitorino (2012) provided a strategic 
model of entry that allows for positive and negative spillovers among retailers and 
showed the factors that influence the profitability of the retail tenant in an SC by using 
a dataset containing information about the retail tenants of SCs in the United States. 
Although SCs have been an important field in real estate in recent years, they have been 
largely overlooked in the marketing literature. While there have been some descriptive 
studies of SCs in the real estate literature, there has been little attempt to explain 
structurally the observed distribution of retail tenant brands in an SC (Vitorino 2012). 
They also showed that these factors can be separated into direct effects such as 
observable demand characteristics and strategic effects, which occur because of the 
influence of other firms in the market. 
On the contrary, a large retailer creates attention for the SC as a key tenant and a 
small retailer benefits by being located near the large retailer. A large retailer is affected 
only by the size of the tenant space it leases and not by the tenant space allocated to 
small retailers. A developer must choose each retailer’s optimal space allocation to 
maximize the total rent of the SC. The space allocation in an SC is based on the volume 
of sales per square meter of retail space (Gerbich 1998). They provided empirical 
evidence of the influence of the retail tenant type on base rents and found that a 
retailer’s costs are a negative determinant of the base rent, which generally supports 
the space allocation results of Brueckner (1993). In connection with the space 
allocation of retailers, the image of SCs may also affect the sales promotion level in 
retail stores based on the size and configuration of SCs as well as the quality of the 
goods and services offered (Brown 1992; Kirkup and Rafiq 1994). In this respect, such 
an image accords with a realistic trend in SCs (Grewal et al. 1998; Mazursky and 
Jacoby 1986). In this way, the image of tenant mix in an SC affects the retail tenants in 
their negotiation over the optimal location (Mejia et al. 2001). Furthermore, Mejia and 
Benjamin (2002) showed that factors such as retail image and the tenant mix of small 
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retailers are the most relevant determinants of sales volume and rent for retailers. 
Third, we discuss the retail demand externalities in an SC. According to the 
analyses of previous studies, the proponents of the demand externalities of retailers are 
considered to be those in large SCs, while small retailers receive demand externalities 
from the additional traffic generated by large retailers (Brueckner 1993; Eppli and 
Shilling 1996; Gould et al. 2005; Pashigian and Gould 1998). Previous studies show 
that the sales of small retailers increase when large retailers that have demand 
externalities are present in an SC. According to Ingene and Ghosh (1990), demand 
externalities flow only in one direction, namely from the retail tenant of a large retailer 
to the retail tenant of a small retailer. They explained that different from the 
accumulative benefits of homogeneous retailers, where similar retailers benefit from 
the two-way flow of customers, retail demand externalities flow from large retailers to 
small retailers. Hence, a large retailer, as a major key tenant, can negotiate a lower rent 
with the developer of an SC, as its exit may cause rental income to drop (Gatzlaff et al. 
1994). This means that its bargaining power is enhanced. 
On the contrary, Pashigian and Gould (1998) insist that what has not been 
established is the quantitative importance of free-rider problems within SCs. According 
to Pashigian and Gould (1998), the quantitative importance of free-rider problems 
within SCs is unclear for two reasons. First, the theory of store location in central places 
has stressed the benefits of attracting more consumers because of retail tenants’ 
agglomeration against the negative effects of increased competition among closely 
situated retail tenants in SCs and largely ignores the externality question altogether. 
Second, their search of the literature found empirical studies that convincingly 
demonstrated the importance of externalities. Therefore, they presented estimates of 
the size of the demand externalities in SCs and identified the types of retail tenants that 
create or benefit from demand externalities. Pashigian and Gould (1998) also found 
that consumers are attracted to SCs because of the presence of well-known large 
retailers with recognized brand names. Large retailers thus generate SC traffic that 
indirectly increases the sales of lesser-known retail tenants such as small retailers in 
SCs. Then, lesser-known small retailers can free ride on the reputations of better-known 
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large retailers. The developer internalizes these externalities by offering rent subsidies 
to large retailers and by charging rent premiums to the other tenants in SCs. Arentze et 
al. (2005) insisted that most previous studies were non-spatial and based on the concept 
externalities of retail stores in SCs. They showed that the location of particular retail 
tenants, which is necessarily based on the agglomeration economics of the spatial 
properties, within the spatial arrangement of the whole SC is a possible extension of 
previous studies. They also found that studies of SCs have paid little attention to the 
detailed spatial aspects of a retail tenant’s location and rent within the SC. According 
to Eppli and Shilling (1996), similar retail tenants lead to an increase in their total sales 
volume for the whole SC, thereby contributing to the success of SCs. 
Moreover, consumers attracted by the brand name of a large retailer are likely to 
visit the SC, and thus the sales and profits of nearby retail tenants are increased by the 
presence of the large retailer (Konishi and Sandfort 2003). Large retailers, which tend 
to be found in most SCs, are valued by developers for their ability to attract consumers 
more than small retailers (Gould et al. 2005; Konishi and Sandfort 2003; Shanmugam 
2013). Shanmugam (2013) developed and empirically tested a theoretical model of the 
competition between large and small retailers in an SC and extended the literature on 
retail co-location to account for the effects on the quality levels of a large retailer as 
well as explain the observed pattern of the choices of the quality levels of a large retailer 
made by developers. They also addressed the fundamental problem of which quality 
level should be selected as an effective factor of a large retailer when a developer is 
profit-maximizing. In addition, in recent research, Gao (2017) studied when and how 
the developer of an SC should subsidize and charge customers. Each retailer provides 
a different product, decides its price, and shares its profit with the developer according 
to its bargaining power. Gao (2017) showed that the greater the bargaining power of 
the developer relative than any retailers, the less elastic is the demand for any retailer, 
or a large cross-price elasticity of demand for the developer favors a subsidy. They also 
showed the condition under which the developer charges a fee at all times. 
Although many previous empirical studies discuss the relationships among two or 
three variables, there is a paucity of theoretical models on the many features and 
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variables of SCs that reflect reality. In our model, we provide a theoretical explanation 
of the effects on the outcomes of variables and the yet-to-be-defined mechanism of the 
relationships among the degree of product substitutability, the differences in the 
proportion of the rent system for large and small retailers (ad valorem royalty or fixed 
fee rent), the profit of the developer, the differences in the degree of demand uncertainty 
for each retailer, the degree of demand uncertainty for the whole SC, and the 
competition between retailers within an SC. Furthermore, in the context of SCs, prior 
research has not paid attention to the theoretical relationship between the proportion of 
the two rent systems between large and small retailers or the profits of developers. In 
addition, insufficient discussion has been carried out on the changes in the proportion 
of the fixed fee rent and ad valorem royalty rent between large and small retailers and 
in the profits of developers by considering the degree of product substitutability and 
demand uncertainty in the context of SCs. Additionally, no argument has been made on 
the degree of the difference in uncertainty between these two types of retailers at the 
same time. Then, the profit of a developer in an SC is determined according to the rent 
system of each retailer and competitive advantage relationship among retailers in SCs 
as well as the various determinants associated with attracting retailers and the 
circumstances of the whole SC. In particular, we discuss how a developer determines 
the rent system for retailers. Thus, we show how the developer optimizes the difference 
in the proportion of the rent system between large and small retailers to increase its 
profit. Hence, we clarify the relationship among variables that can be observed in 
reality by using a theoretical model. 
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2.2. Two-part tariff model 
 
Over time, the literature on the two-part tariff model has developed from differing 
points of view. Many previous studies of the two-part tariff model are from research 
fields on licensing contracts. First, Arrow (1962) started the theoretical literature on the 
patent licensing contract by examining the performance of fixed fees and royalties as 
instruments for the licensing of innovations. 
Some classic studies are only concerned with one form of contract, either fixed 
fees or royalties (Gallini and Winter 1985; Grossman and Shapiro 1987; Katz and 
Shapiro 1985). Specifically, Gallini and Winter (1985) analyzed licensing in R&D and 
considered only the licensing of royalties. On the contrary, Katz and Shapiro (1985) 
studied an asymmetric duopoly game of R&D rivalry and considered only licensing 
contracts with a fixed fee. Research extended these studies by including other elements 
in the model from an alternative perspective. For example, some researchers considered 
the oligopoly market model and showed the prerogative of the per unit royalty in the 
model from the position of the licenser. They considered the case of homogeneous 
products by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty under Cournot competition and 
Bertrand competition (Kamien and Tauman 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1985). The above 
analysis focused on the impact of licensing contracts on innovation activities. Licensing 
contracts can adopt different contract systems such as involving fixed fees and royalties. 
The fact that licensing contracts by means of a royalty dominate those by means of a 
fixed fee is a general result in the licensing contract model. However, Kamien and 
Tauman (1986) found that a licensing contract by means of a fixed fee is superior to a 
licensing contact by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers. In this 
way, the early literature showed that a licensing contract by means of a fixed fee is 
superior to a licensing contract by means of a royalty. 
Despite the contribution of the early literature, these studies considered a license 
to companies that are not competitors. At that time, when a company licenses to a 
company that is not a competitor, licensing by means of using royalties results in an 
increase in the marginal cost of the licensed company. As a result, the production 
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activity of the company is reduced by the license. In this way, when one company 
licenses to another company that is not a competitor, licensing by means of a fixed fee 
is superior to licensing by means of a royalty. On the contrary, when a company licenses 
a company that is a competitor, licensing by means of a royalty is superior to licensing 
by means of a fixed fee. Previous studies have focused on the condition under which 
this relationship is reversed as the situation demands. 
Following on from this research in the field of licensing contracts, some 
researchers have found that the licenser may desire contracts by means of a royalty 
rather than contracts by means of a fixed fee under both types of competition (Wang 
1998; Wang and Yang 1999). For example, Wang (1998) compared a licensing contract 
by means of a fixed fee with a contract by means of a royalty in a homogeneous goods 
duopoly. The author found that royalty licensing can be superior to a contract with a 
fixed fee for the licenser, as the licenser has a cost advantage over the licensee under 
contract licensing by means of a royalty, whereas the two firms compete similarly by 
using a contract with a fixed fee. On the contrary, Wang and Yang (1999) considered 
licensing by an innovating firm to its competitor in a differentiated duopoly with 
Bertrand competition. In this paper, they showed that a contract by means of a royalty 
may be superior to a contract by means of a fixed fee. In addition, Wang (2002) 
extended the homogeneous product model considered by Wang (1998) to differentiated 
products in a duopoly model. The author examined the incentive to license for the 
licenser as well as how alternative licensing methods compare for different degrees of 
differentiation between two products. The interesting finding here is generalizing the 
results in the homogeneous product model. Moreover, the licenser may even license a 
drastic innovation; when that occurs, a royalty is again the preferred choice (Wang 
2002). However, according to these studies, the possibility of licensing is measured by 
two points: royalty licensing or fixed fee licensing. Therefore, they only obtained the 
result that either type of rent system is preferable at the equilibrium. 
Moreover, Kamien and Tauman (2002) compared the most profitable modes of 
licensing a cost-reducing invention by an inventor. They found that an industry 
incumbent favors licensing by means of a royalty per unit of output. On the contrary, 
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an outsider prefers to auction a contract by means of a fixed fee. Previous studies show 
that the optimal contract for the licenser always includes a positive per unit royalty in 
horizontally differentiated Cournot and Bertrand duopolies with substitute products 
(Mukherjee and Balasubramanian 2001; Faulí-Oller and Sandonís 2002). Mukherjee 
and Balasubramanian (2001) considered a model in the Cournot duopoly market with 
horizontally differentiated products. In their model, the contract consists of the fixed 
fee and the per unit royalty for products. Then, when the goods are close substitutes, 
they showed that the per unit royalty is the only optimal solution. However, whether 
the incentive for imitation increases with product differentiation is ambiguous. They 
showed the implications of multiple contracts such as dealing with our model. On the 
contrary, Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002) considered the situations where the licensing 
contract with a rival firm reduces social welfare, using two-part tariff contracts, which 
is a fixed fee plus a linear per unit royalty. They showed that if the firms compete on 
prices, the goods are sufficiently close substitutes, and innovation is sufficiently large 
but not drastic, the above situation occurs. 
Moreover, Saggi and Vettas (2002) examined vertical oligopoly markets with both 
intrabrand and interbrand competition. They characterized the equilibrium contracts as 
a royalty or wholesale price and fixed fee when each manufacturer makes a contract 
with multiple retailers. Specifically, when choosing the royalty, the manufacturer has 
to adjust two opposing incentives (Saggi and Vettas 2002). On the contrary, they 
showed that retailers prefer to be more passive (i.e., the royalties control the 
competition between retailers and their rivals). In addition, they found that the number 
of retailers is more than relative to that of rival retailers and that the higher the degree 
of product differentiation, the higher the royalty at the equilibrium. In their model, 
when the number of retailers is endogenous, each manufacturer chooses only one 
retailer. Moreover, they found the profit for competitors when the number of 
independent retailers is large under only a fixed fee in their model. 
On the basis of prior studies of the per unit royalty and/or fixed fee, there is a 
growing literature on two-part tariffs. We review the progress of this research on the 
two-part tariff model. Griva and Vettas (2015) analyzed aspects of two-part tariff 
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competition between duopoly firms with homogeneous service when consumers differ 
in how much they use the product. They showed that competition with only one price 
may allow both firms to earn positive profits if the other price is sufficiently different 
between firms. Kitagawa et al. (2014) examined two-part tariff contracts consisting of 
a fixed fee plus a linear per unit royalty and identified the optimal two-part tariff 
contract for a patent holder depending on the cost of innovation by the rival, market 
parameter, and substitutability of goods. They focused attention on the cost of the 
innovation. However, in their study, ad valorem royalties were not included. 
Martín and Saracho (2016) showed that a licenser may be interested in licensing 
by means of ad valorem royalties even in the context of the product innovation analyzed 
by Kitagawa et al. (2014). Kitagawa et al. (2014) showed that two-part tariff contracts 
consist of a fixed fee plus a linear royalty per unit; however, they did not consider the 
ad valorem royalty. Therefore, Martín and Saracho (2016) extended the analysis to 
consider this type of royalty. They found that the licenser may prefer to use ad valorem 
royalties in the contract rather than per unit royalties. In particular, they showed that ad 
valorem royalties are desirable when the goods are similar to others or the cost for 
developing the new product is high. The analysis and conclusions were similar to those 
in Martín and Saracho (2015). The difference in these works is the different ways in 
which the competitor of the licenser determines the value of the optimal royalty. Martín 
and Saracho (2015) studied the optimal two-part tariff contract that has a patent on a 
process innovation in a model of the differentiated Cournot duopoly market. They 
analyzed how the use of ad valorem royalties or per unit royalties in licensing contracts 
may differ depending on both the variety of goods and the degree of the product 
differentiation of goods. 
As a preliminary, Martín and Saracho (2010) stated that most licensing contracts 
observed empirically include either per unit or ad valorem royalties. The previous 
literature generally focused on per unit royalties. They provided a simple justification 
for the presence of ad valorem royalties in contracts and compared ad valorem royalties 
with per unit royalties. They found that including ad valorem royalties in the contract 
allows the licenser to strategically commit to be less aggressive, as the revenues from 
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licensing increase in the price. Therefore, they provided a simple justification for the 
presence of ad valorem royalties in licensing contracts. In addition, licensing may have 
a negative effect on consumers (Martín and Saracho 2010). Interestingly, the empirical 
evidence on licensing contracts has also shown the use of ad valorem royalties, that is, 
payments corresponding to a share of the sales revenues of the licensee (Martín and 
Saracho 2015). 
In reality and in empirical research on SCs, the developer uses the royalties of 
revenue sharing, called ad valorem royalties. Not only Martín and Saracho (2010, 2016) 
but also other studies have included this type of payment in the theoretical analysis and 
some interesting aspects have emerged for the literature on patent licensing. For 
instance, Heywood et al. (2014) showed that the licenser can choose any two-part tariff 
contract with either per unit or ad valorem royalties. In their model, they did not use 
the fixed fee contract and the presence of asymmetric information uniquely drives the 
per unit royalties. Thus, they served to emphasize the importance of royalties even with 
asymmetric information and with the possibility of two-part tariffs. In addition, they 
showed that per unit royalties always generate higher social welfare than ad valorem 
royalties. Moreover, Niu (2013) proved that profit sharing licensing and per unit royalty 
licensing are equivalent to each other regarding both profitability and welfare in a 
duopoly with symmetric product differentiations. In addition, Niu (2013) confirmed 
the conclusion of the model proposed by Martín and Saracho (2010) in a more general 
demand setting and further explored the consequence of relaxing the symmetry 
assumption on demand. 
In this way, the literature has focused on the rent system of per unit royalties. In 
fact, ad valorem royalties and fixed rents are relatively commonly used in the rent 
contracts of SCs. Nonetheless, researchers have not necessarily used ad valorem 
royalties, fixed fee rents, and two-part tariffs (ad valorem royalties plus fixed fees), 
instead using a rent system comprising per unit royalties, fixed fee rents, and two-part 
tariffs (per unit royalties plus fixed fees). In other words, in previous studies, despite 
its importance, the ad valorem royalty with two-part tariffs has received less attention, 
especially compared with the rent system of the per unit royalty. Therefore, we 
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conducted research to bridge this gap between reality and the research field. The 
contribution of this research is that we clarify the relationship among variables that can 
be observed in reality by using a theoretical model. Furthermore, in the context of SCs, 
prior research has not paid attention to the theoretical relationship between the 
proportion of the two rent systems (ad valorem royalty and fixed fee rent) for retailers 
and the profits of developers. Further, insufficient discussion has been carried out on 
the changes in the proportion of the fixed fee rent and ad valorem royalty rent between 
large and small retailers and in the profits of developers by considering the degree of 
product substitutability and demand uncertainty in the context of SCs. Additionally, no 
argument has been made on the degree of the difference in uncertainty between these 
two types of retailers at the same time. By using a model of the optimal two-part tariff 
licensing between a developer and retailers as a base model, we focus on the effect of 
the demand uncertainty situation as the extended model. The result of our paper is novel 
for building a theoretical model using revenue sharing, called the ad valorem rent 
system, which is commonly used in practice. 
In sum, contrary to the literature that focuses on competition given the per unit 
royalty under the impact of the possibility of licensing on innovation activities, the 
unique theoretical contribution of our work lies in showing the equilibrium structure of 
the percentage of the ad valorem royalty rent and fixed fee rent in the rent system for 
the retailer by the developer in a vertical market with demand uncertainty in SCs. To 
the best of our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst to show the interesting point that the 
equilibrium structure changes by changing the degree of product substitutability and 
demand uncertainty in the context of SCs and we provide the example of the market 
for SCs such as those of outlet malls and SCs that matches this theoretical result. 
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Chapter 3   SC Model 
Ad valorem royalty plus fixed fee model 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In an SC, there are a developer and retailers. A developer attracts retailers to an SC, 
while retailers make a tenant contract with a developer. Since an SC has a key feature 
that retail tenants are placed side by side, it is important to consider the degree of 
competition among retailers in an SC. Then, the profits of the developer may be 
affected depending on the variety of retail tenants in the SC (i.e., whether similar 
retailers sell similar products or differentiated products). Given that asymmetric 
retailers (i.e., large and small retailers) sell products differentiated by different brands 
in the SC, we can analyze and capture the situation of retail tenants that is closer to a 
real SC. Then, the rent system in SCs is an important problem for the developer because 
it gains a great profit from the rent charged to large and small retailers. In fact, revenue 
sharing royalties, which depend on the sales of retail tenants and fixed fee rents, are 
relatively commonly used in rent contracts in SCs. Therefore, in the research field of 
SCs, it is important to consider not only one type of rent contract but also rent types 
combined with the fixed fee rent and royalty rent to consider the revenue sharing 
royalty rent according to the sales of the retail tenants in SCs. However, in previous 
studies, despite its importance, the ad valorem royalty with two-part tariffs has received 
less attention, especially compared with the rent system of the per unit royalty. The 
same holds in the field of SC research. In this paper, we adopt a two-part tariff model 
based on ad valorem royalties for this problem. Such a treatment by the optimal two-
part tariff licensing is also used in Martín and Saracho (2016). Therefore, we expand 
their model and guarantee novelty as a theoretical model because they presented an 
applicable ad valorem royalty model. In this way, we bridge this gap between reality 
and the research field. 
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When there are both large retailers and small retailers in one SC, the developer 
may attempt to make the competitive advantage of small retailers stronger by 
decreasing the royalty for the small retailer and improving the quantity of products for 
them, thereby intensifying the competition between large and small retailers in the 
whole SC. However, in our model, the developer gives preferential treatment to large 
retailers rather than intensifying the competition between large and small retailers by 
strengthening small retailers’ competitive advantage at the equilibrium. In other words, 
we found that the developer chooses an action to make the large retailers even stronger 
and increase the sales volume of the large retailers by decreasing their royalty to 
increase the profit of the developer. As a result, we found that the developer collects 
rents with a greater ratio of the fixed fee from large retailers and the rents with a greater 
ratio of the ad valorem royalty from small retailers. 
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3.2. Model 
First, we consider the ad valorem royalty plus fixed fee model without demand 
uncertainty. We expand the model developed by Martín and Saracho (2016). In our 
paper, we adopt the method of two-part tariffs with ad valorem royalties used in Martín 
and Saracho (2016). We assume an SC where a developer determines the royalty of the 
rent to the two types of retailers. To sell products, each retailer must sign lease contracts 
with the developer. Consider the developer (D) that uses a two-part tariff licensing 
mechanism to contract with each retailer. We call the retailer of the large efficient 
company the large retailer (L) and the other of the small inefficient company the small 
retailer (S). Then, each retailer sells sales volume 𝑞𝑖 (𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝑆). The retailers get the 
product from manufacturers except the developer. Then, we assume a cost-competitive 
setting such as that in the apparel industry. Each retailer’s rent depends on its sales of 
tenant  𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 . For simplicity, we assume that 𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 is the rent according to royalty 𝑟𝑖 
and the sales of tenant 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 that retailer 𝑖 attains. Then, 𝑓𝑖 denotes the fixed fee rent 
of each retailer. For simplicity, the marginal cost is given by 𝑐 and we assume that 𝑐 
is a sufficiently small positive value. Specifically, we explain what kind of situation 
this assumes. We consider the situation that the willingness to pay of consumers 
changes depending on the differences in retail brands and brand image for consumer. 
In this case, it is a natural setting to assume little difference in the goods among the 
retailers. Then, we identify that it has no effect on the result. To keep positive outcomes, 
we assume that 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐).  
The utility maximization problem is 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝐿,𝑞𝑆,𝑚
𝑈(𝑞𝐿, 𝑞𝑆, 𝑚) = 𝑞𝐿 + 𝑎𝑞𝑆 −
1
2
(𝑞𝐿
2 + 𝑞𝑆
2) − 𝛾𝑞𝐿𝑞𝑆 +𝑚,     (3-1) 
       𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 + 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 +𝑚 ≤ 𝐼, 
where 0 < 𝑎 < 1  and 0 < 𝛾 < 1 , and the degree of product substitutability is 
measured by 𝛾. When 𝛾 → 1, the goods are perfect substitutes and for 𝛾 → 0, the 
goods are unrelated, that is, we use 𝛾  (the degree of product substitutability) as a 
measure of the competition of the retail market. If 𝛾  is large, the products are 
homogenized and the competition of the retail market becomes intense. Otherwise, if 
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𝛾  is small, the products are differentiated and the competition of the retail market 
becomes moderate. 
Considering the above assumption in our model, we obtain the condition of the 
parameter that satisfies a negative definite. As noted above, we assume a sufficiently 
small positive value 𝑐. We assume that the profit function consequently is concave. By 
solving the determinant of the Hessian matrix, we obtain the condition of the parameter 
that satisfies the second-order condition. Then, combined with the condition to keep 
positive outcomes, we obtain the following condition: 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐). When 𝑚 
is the amount of the numeraire good, 𝑝𝑖 is the price of the retailer’s product, and 𝐼 is 
the income for the consumer. We employ the utility function form represented by 
Equation (3-1) for the following reason. If the product quality supplied by a retailer is 
zero, a consumer has no incentive to buy the product. Hence, our utility function is 
consistent with consumer behavior. 
This product differentiation, as assumed in the paper, may be due to each retailer 
of different brand names. From the first-order conditions of the utility maximization 
problem, the inverse demand functions that the two retailers face are given by 
𝑝𝐿 = 1 − 𝑞𝐿 − 𝛾𝑞𝑆,           (3-2) 
𝑝𝑆 = 𝑎 − 𝑞𝑆 − 𝛾𝑞𝐿.                      (3-3) 
The profit function of the developer is given as 
𝜋𝐷 = 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 + 𝑓𝐿 + 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 + 𝑓𝑆.                (3-4) 
The profit function of retailer 𝑖 is given as 
𝜋𝐿 = 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 − 𝑓𝐿,       𝜋𝑆 = 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆 − 𝑓𝑆.      
(3-5), (3-6) 
Consumer surplus 𝐶𝑆 = (𝑞𝐿
2 + 2𝛾𝑞𝐿𝑞𝑆 + 𝑞𝑆
2)/2 and social welfare 𝑆𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 +
𝜋𝐷 + 𝜋𝐿 + 𝜋𝑆. We next delineate the timeline of a series of decisions made by the 
players comprising the supply chain. The setting of the assumption and timing of the 
game are described as follows. We consider a two-stage game. In stage one, the 
developer chooses the royalty and fixed fee of each retailer, 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑓𝑖. In stage two, 
each retailer independently and simultaneously chooses its sales, 𝑞𝑖. We solve for the 
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equilibrium by backward induction. 
In the model, we assume that the retailer needs to pay the fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 regardless 
of the sales volume 𝑞𝑖. Regarding this point, when contracting with the developer in 
stage one, retailers have a contract that they have to pay a fixed fee rent to the developer 
when they open a store in the SC. In other words, the fixed fee can be said to be the 
cost for participation in the SC. Since the fixed fee rent of retailer 𝑓𝑖 has already been 
determined when each retailer decides  𝑞𝑖 , retailers must pay the fixed fee rent  𝑓𝑖 
without depending on any sales volume 𝑞𝑖. Specifically, since we assume that we do 
not think of a situation where retailers do not have to pay the fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 when they do 
not sell in SCs, retailers have to pay the fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 even in any financial condition. In 
other words, retailers have already paid the fixed fee rent  𝑓𝑖  as a sunk cost to a 
developer on a contract basis. 
From a game procedure point of view, the retailer decides whether to contract or 
reject at the stage of concluding the contract. In stage one, the developer decides the 
fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖 and royalty 𝑟𝑖 and presents a contract to retailers. Then, the retailers 
receive a contract agreement from the developer, calculate the fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖, and 
sign a contract. At that time, because retailers have already paid the fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖 to 
the developer, in the second stage the retailer decides the sales volume in the situation 
that the fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 is a sunk cost. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of events. The 
model is solved with the use of backward induction along the timeline to derive the 
subgame perfect equilibrium in this dynamic game. 
Developer chooses the 
royalty and fixed fee of each 
retailer, 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑓𝑖  
Each retailer independently 
and simultaneously 
chooses its sales, 𝑞𝑖 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
Figure 1. Timeline of events. 
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Table 1. Nomenclature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑞𝐿  sales quantity of the large retailer 
 𝑞𝑆  sales quantity of the small retailer 
 𝑝𝐿  price of the large retailer 
 𝑝𝐿  price of the small retailer 
 𝑟𝐿  royalty of the large retailer 
 𝑟𝑆  royalty of the small retailer 
 𝑓𝐿  fixed fee rent of the large retailer 
 𝑓𝑆  fixed fee rent of the small retailer 
 𝜋𝐷  profit of the developer 
 𝜋𝐿  profit of the large retailer 
 𝜋𝑆  profit of the small retailer 
 𝐶𝑆  consumer surplus 
 𝑆𝑊  social welfare 
 𝑎   intercept of the inverse demand function 
 𝑐    marginal cost of retailers  
 𝛾   degree of the product substitutability 
 *     superscript for equilibrium of the old model 
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3.3. Calculating the equilibrium 
In this section, we identify the subgame perfect equilibrium. We consider the following 
two-stage game. In the second stage, each retailer chooses its sales quantity.  
The maximization problem for the large retailer is 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝐿
[ 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 − 𝑓𝐿 ].                (3-7) 
The maximization problem for the small retailer is stated as 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝑆
[ 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆 − 𝑓𝑆 ].                 (3-8) 
Note that retailers have already paid the fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖 as a sunk cost to the developer. 
The first-order conditions (𝜕𝜋𝐿/𝜕𝑞𝐿 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜕𝜋𝑆/𝜕𝑞𝑆 = 0) are derived as 
𝑞𝐿 =
2(1 − 𝑟𝑆)[(1 − 𝑟𝐿) − 𝑐] − 𝛾(1 − 𝑟𝐿)[𝑎(1 − 𝑟𝑆) − 𝑐]
(4 − 𝛾2)(1 − 𝑟𝐿)(1 − 𝑟𝑆)
, 
𝑞𝑆 =
2(1 − 𝑟𝐿)[𝑎(1 − 𝑟𝑆) − 𝑐] − 𝛾(1 − 𝑟𝑆)[(1 − 𝑟𝐿) − 𝑐]
(4 − 𝛾2)(1 − 𝑟𝐿)(1 − 𝑟𝑆)
.   
(3-9), (3-10) 
By substituting this outcome into the profit of the developer, we have the maximization 
problem of the developer as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 
𝑟𝐿 ,𝑟𝑆,𝑓𝐿 ,𝑓𝑆
 [ 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 + 𝑓𝐿 + 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 + 𝑓𝑆 ].                    
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 − 𝑓𝐿 ≥ 0, 
     𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆 − 𝑓𝑆 ≥ 0. 
 (3-11) 
As the objective function is an increasing function of  𝑓𝑖 and the developer takes 
the value of the largest fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 within the range that satisfies the participation 
constraints, it is the optimal strategy for the developer to determine the value of the 
fixed fee 𝑓𝑖. Then, since the value of the fixed fee  𝑓𝑖 should be determined to bind 
with the participation constraints, the value of the fixed fee  𝑓𝑖 is as follows: 
{
  𝑓𝐿 = 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 ,
  𝑓𝑆 = 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆.
                 
(3-12), (3-13) 
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By substituting (3-12) and (3-13) into (3-11), we can write the expected profit 
maximization in the form that also includes the participation constraints. In other words, 
we can rewrite the developer’s expectation profit maximization problem as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 
𝑟𝐿 ,𝑟𝑆
 [  𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 + 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆  ].                  (3-14) 
The first-order condition (𝜕𝜋𝐷/𝜕𝑟𝐿 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜕𝜋𝐷/𝜕𝑟𝑆 = 0) in this stage yields 
𝑟𝐿
∗ =
𝛾[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
, 
𝑟𝑆
∗ =
𝛾[(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
, 
(3-15), (3-16) 
where the variables with superscript * represent the equilibrium values. By solving the 
above equation, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes and provide the results in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Equilibrium outcomes 
 Equilibrium 
𝜋𝐷
∗  𝑎(𝑎 − 2[𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]) + 2𝑐(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑐) + 1
4(1 − 𝛾2)
 
𝑞𝐿
∗ (1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)
2(1 − 𝛾2)
 
𝑞𝑆
∗ 𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)
2(1 − 𝛾2)
 
𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝛾[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
 
𝑟𝑆
∗ 𝛾[(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
 
𝑓𝐿
∗ 𝑐[(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]2
2(1 − 𝛾2)[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
 
𝑓𝑆
∗ 𝑐[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]2
2(1 − 𝛾2)[𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
 
𝐶𝑆∗ 𝑎(𝑎 − 2[𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]) + 2𝑐(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑐) + 1
8(1 − 𝛾2)
 
𝑆𝑊∗ 3𝑎[(𝑎 − 2[𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]) + 2𝑐(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑐) + 1]
8(1 − 𝛾2)
 
 
The superscript * denotes the equilibrium for the benchmark model. 𝐶𝑆  is 
consumer surplus and 𝑆𝑊 is social welfare. 
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3.4. Equilibrium and comparative statics 
This paper compares the contract of the rent system by means of the proportion of a 
fixed fee rent with the contract of the rent system by means of the proportion of the ad 
valorem royalties in a simple Cournot duopoly model. We compare the difference in 
the ad valorem royalty of the large and small retailers, 𝑟𝐿
∗, 𝑟𝑆
∗, as well as the difference 
in the fixed fee rent of the large and small retailers, 𝑓𝑆
∗, 𝑓𝐿
∗. 
 
Proposition 1 (Royalty and fixed fee of large and small retailers) 
By solving the inequalities of the equilibrium, we draw the conclusions of the 
relationship that 𝑟𝐿
∗ < 𝑟𝑆
∗, 𝑓𝑆
∗ < 𝑓𝐿
∗. 
 
Proof.  As we calculate the difference between the two equilibria of the ad valorem 
royalties of the large and small retailers, 𝑟𝐿
∗ and 𝑟𝑆
∗, as well as the difference between 
the fixed fee rents of the large and small retailers, 𝑓𝐿
∗ and 𝑓𝑆
∗, we draw the following 
conclusions. Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied: 
𝑟𝐿
∗ − 𝑟𝑆
∗ =
2(1 − 𝑎)𝑐(1 − 𝛾)𝛾(1 + 𝛾)2
[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)][𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
< 0, 
𝑓𝐿
∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗ =
(
𝑐[(1 − 𝑎𝛾)− 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]2
𝛾(𝑎− 𝛾)+ 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
−
𝑐[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]2
𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾)+ 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
)
2(1 − 𝛾2)
 > 0. 
 (3-17), (3-18). □ 
The intuition is as follows. This result suggests that the developer has incentives 
to increase the sales volume 𝑞𝐿 of the large retailer. Moreover, in this paper, since the 
movement of the sales volume of the large retailer 𝑞𝐿 and the sales volume of the 
small retailer 𝑞𝑆 is symmetric in our model, the developer actively acts to discount the 
ad valorem royalty of the large retailer 𝑟𝐿 . In other words, the developer should 
decrease the ad valorem royalty of the large retailer 𝑟𝐿, and think that it is better to 
increase the sales volume of the large retailer 𝑞𝐿. The reason is that in the market in 
our model, the more valuable product is 𝑞𝐿, which is the product that the large retailer 
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sells. Furthermore, given the impact on the final profit, we consider that this intuition 
makes sense since the impact on the profits of large retailers should be greater than the 
impact on the profits of small retailers. 
Let us consider the reaction function in the second stage. At that time, if the 
developer would like to increase the volume of the sales of either retailer, it would 
obviously like to increase the sales volume of the large retailer 𝑞𝐿. As explained above, 
if the developer would like to increase the sales volume of the large retailer 𝑞𝐿, it acts 
to lower 𝑟𝐿 in the equilibrium to increase the incentive to lower the royalty of the large 
retailer 𝑟𝐿. The proposition is a simple mechanism. As a result of the analysis of the 
model in this paper, we found in the equilibrium that the best policy of the rent system 
by developers is that the developer gives preferential treatment to large retailers by 
decreasing the royalty of the large retailer, 𝑟𝐿. 
By differentiating these equilibrium outcomes with respect to the degree of 
product substitutability 𝛾, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2 (Effect of the degree of product substitutability) 
The results of the comparative statics for the degree of product substitutability are as 
follows. As the degree of product substitutability 𝛾 increases, the sales volume of the 
small retailer 𝑞𝑆
∗  and the fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗  decrease and the 
royalty of the large retailer 𝑟𝐿
∗ increases at the equilibrium. Then, the profit of the 
developer 𝜋𝐷
∗  decreases at the equilibrium: 
𝜕𝑟𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
=
2𝑐[𝑎(1 + 𝛾2) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 − 2𝛾]
[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]2
,  
  
𝜕𝑟𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
=
2𝑐[(1 + 𝛾2 ) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 − 2𝑎𝛾]
[𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]2
> 0,  
𝜕𝑓𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
=
𝑐[𝑎(1 + 𝛾2) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 − 2𝛾][𝑎𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾) − 1]
[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝑐) − 2(1 + 𝑐)𝛾2 + 3𝑐 + 1]
2(1 − 𝛾2)2[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]2
,   
  
𝜕𝑓𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
= −
𝑐[(1 + 𝛾2 ) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 − 2𝑎𝛾][𝑎 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾) − 𝛾]
[𝑎 − 2𝛾2(𝑎 + 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑐)𝛾 + 3𝑐]
2(1 − 𝛾2)2[𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]2
< 0,  
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𝜕𝑞𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
=
𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 − 𝑎(1 + 𝛾2) + 2𝛾
2(1 − 𝛾2)2
,   
𝜕𝑞𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
= −
1 − 𝛾(2𝑎 − 𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2
2(1 − 𝛾2)2
< 0,  
𝜕𝐶𝑆∗
𝜕𝛾
= −
[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)][(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
4(1 − 𝛾2)2
 < 0, 
𝜕𝑆𝑊∗
𝜕𝛾
= −
3[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)][(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
4(1 − 𝛾2)2
 < 0, 
𝜕𝜋𝐷
∗
𝜕𝛾
= −
[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)][(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
2(1 − 𝛾2)2
 < 0. 
(3-19), (3-20), (3-21), (3-22), (3-23), (3-24), (3-25), (3-26), (3-27) 
 
Next, we analyze the effect of an increase in the degree of product substitutability 
and tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾) on some of the outcomes in the following 
propositions. First, we mention some important properties of the change in the degree 
of product substitutability when we consider what can be claimed by the comparative 
static science. When 𝛾  rises and the product of each retailer is approaching 
homogeneous goods, the developer takes actions that emphasize large retailers, where 
𝛾 = 1 means homogeneous goods. We consider the situations where the values of the 
intercepts are different for large and small retailers as the asymmetric downstream 
companies when the products of each retailer are homogeneous. In view of the above, 
it is mathematically meant that small retailers are inefficient companies compared with 
large retailers. Therefore, when we consider the question of which of the large and 
small retailers should take action in a situation where retailers sell similar goods, 
naturally, the developer gives preferential treatment to the large, more efficient retailer. 
Although this is an extreme case, this effect becomes more pronounced as 𝛾 
approaches 1, that is, as the goods of each retailer become closer to the homogeneous 
goods. 
In addition, when the degree of product substitutability 𝛾  becomes large, we 
consider two effects. One is the effect of the products of each retailer approaching 
homogeneous goods and the other is the effect of market shrinkage. When 𝛾 = 0, we 
get two inverse demand functions. On the contrary, when 𝛾 = 1, the inverse demand 
function effectively becomes one. Therefore, there are two effects on the market when 
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𝛾 increases; when the market shrinks such as the situations of the latter effects, this 
property basically has the effect of lowering the sales volume of the retailers. This 
reduces the variables such as the royalties and fixed fee rents of the retailers in our 
model, which is commonly called the marginal cost. This is the fundamental property 
of the effect that the market shrinks when 𝛾 increases. Moreover, we consider the 
effect of approaching homogeneous goods when 𝛾 increases. As mentioned earlier, 
when the product of the retailer approaches homogeneous goods, the problem arises as 
to which retailer is preferred for the developer. Then, although we omit the explanation 
here, the effect that the developer takes the measure that prefers the large retailer comes 
out strongly. Considering these properties, we consider what can be claimed by 
comparative static science. 
By differentiating the royalty of each retailer at the equilibrium with respect to the 
degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we obtain the following proposition. 
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Proposition 3 (Effect on the royalty of each retailer) 
As the degree of product substitutability and tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾) 
increase, the royalty of the small retailer 𝑟𝑆
∗ increases. Then, the conditions under 
which an increase in the degree of product substitutability and tougher competition (an 
increase in 𝛾 ) increases or decreases the royalty of the large retailer 𝑟𝐿
∗  are as 
follows: 
 
{
 
 
 
 
     
                                                                            
∂𝑟𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0        𝑖𝑓      
𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾
1 + 𝛾2
< 𝑎                              
 
∂𝑟𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0       𝑖𝑓    𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) <  𝑎 <
𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾
1 + 𝛾2
   
                                                                                     
                  
                                      
∂𝑟𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0 
(3-28), (3-29), (3-30) 
 
Proof.  We explain the condition under which an increase in the degree of product 
substitutability and tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾) increases or decreases the 
royalty of the large retailer 𝑟𝐿
∗.  
By differentiating these equilibria of the royalty of the large retailer 𝑟𝐿
∗  with 
respect to the degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we gain the expression  𝜕𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ =
[𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾 − 𝑎(1 + 𝛾2)] [2(1 − 𝛾2)2]⁄ . Then, we solve 𝜕𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0  for  𝑎 
and obtain the equality  𝑎 = [𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ . In our model, when the 
inequality is satisfied [𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ < 𝑎 , we obtain the inequality 
𝜕𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0.  On the contrary, when the inequality is satisfied 𝑎 <
[𝑐(𝛾 − 1)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ , we obtain the inequality 𝜕𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0. To keep positive 
outcomes, we assume that the inequalities are satisfied 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐). Therefore, 
we obtain the proposition. □ 
 
From Proposition 3, the intuition is as follows. The royalty of the large retailer 
decreases in the range of 𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) <  𝑎 < [𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄  for the 
rent contracts. In other words, the range indicates that the large retailer has been given 
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preferential treatment by the developer by lowering commissions. Therefore, when 𝛾 
becomes large, the large retailer is presented with the preferential treatment details from 
the developer. 
 
 
We depict the result of Proposition 3 in Figure 2 and Figure 3. As shown in Figure 
2, the gray area is 𝜕𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0. In the non-shaded area, we find the region in which 
the royalty of the large retailer  𝑟𝐿
∗ decreases with the degree of product substitutability 
and the index of competition 𝛾. On the contrary, as shown in Figure 3, we find the 
region in which the royalty of the small retailer 𝑟𝑆
∗ increases with the degree of product 
substitutability and the index of competition 𝛾. 
By differentiating the sales volume of each retailer at the equilibrium with respect 
to the degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Effect on the royalty of 
the large retailer 
Figure 3. Effect on the royalty of 
the small retailer 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
 
 𝜕𝑟𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0   
 𝜕𝑟𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0   
 𝜕𝑟𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0   
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Proposition 4 (Effect on the sales volume of each retailer) 
As the degree of product substitutability and tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾) 
increase, the sales volume of the small retailer 𝑞𝑆
∗ decreases. Then, the conditions 
under which an increase in the degree of product substitutability and tougher 
competition (an increase in 𝛾) increases or decreases the sales volume of the large 
retailer 𝑞𝐿
∗ are as follows: 
 
{
 
 
 
 
     
                                                                            
∂𝑞𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0        𝑖𝑓     𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) <  𝑎 <
𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾
1 + 𝛾2
 
 
∂𝑞𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0       𝑖𝑓    
𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾
1 + 𝛾2
< 𝑎                                 
                                                                                     
                  
                                      
∂𝑞𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0 
 (3-31), (3-32), (3-33) 
 
Proof.  We now explain the condition under which an increase in the degree of product 
substitutability and tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾) increases or decreases the 
sales volume of the large retailer 𝑞𝐿
∗.  
By differentiating these equilibria of the sales volume of the large retailer 𝑞𝐿
∗ with 
respect to the degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we gain the expression  𝜕𝑞𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ =
[𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 − 𝑎(1 + 𝛾2) + 2𝛾] [2(1 − 𝛾2)2]⁄ . Then, we solve 𝜕𝑞𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0  for  𝑎 
and obtain the equality  𝑎 = [𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ . In our model, when the 
inequality is satisfied 𝑎 < [𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ , we obtain the inequality 
𝜕𝑞𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0.  On the contrary, when the inequality is satisfied 
[𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ < 𝑎 , we obtain the inequality 𝜕𝑞𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0.  To keep 
positive outcomes, we assume the inequalities are satisfied 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐). 
Therefore, we obtain the proposition. □ 
 
From Proposition 4, the intuition is as follows. We consider the effect on the sales 
volume of each retailer based on the discussion of Proposition 3. We show that the 
royalty of the large retailer decreases in the range of 𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) <  𝑎 <
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[𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄  for rent contracts (Proposition 3). In other words, the 
range indicates that the large retailer has been given preferential treatment by the 
developer by lowering commissions. Therefore, when 𝛾  becomes large, the large 
retailer is presented with the preferential treatment details from the developer. Then, 
from Proposition 4, we show that the sales volume of a large retailer increases because 
the large retailer is presented with the preferential treatment details from the developer.  
 
 
We depict the result of Proposition 4 in Figure 4 and Figure 5. As shown in Figure 
4, we find the region in which the sales volume of the large retailer 𝑞𝐿
∗ increases or 
decreases with the degree of product substitutability and the index of competition 𝛾. 
On the contrary, as shown in Figure 5, we find the region in which the sales volume of 
the small retailer 𝑞𝑆
∗ decreases with the degree of product substitutability and the index 
of competition 𝛾. 
By differentiating the fixed fee of each retailer at the equilibrium with respect to 
the degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we obtain the following proposition. 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
 
Figure 4. Effect on the sales volume 
of the large retailer 
 𝜕𝑞𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0 
 𝜕𝑞𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
 
 𝜕𝑞𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0 
Figure 5. Effect on the sales volume 
of the small retailer 
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Proposition 5 (Effect on the fixed fee of each retailer) 
As the degree of product substitutability and tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾) 
increase, the fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗ decreases. Then, the conditions 
under which an increase in the degree of product substitutability and tougher 
competition (an increase in 𝛾) increases or decreases the fixed fee rent of the large 
retailer 𝑓𝐿
∗ are as follows: 
 
{
 
 
 
 
     
                                                                            
∂𝑓𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0        𝑖𝑓     𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) <  𝑎 <
𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾
1 + 𝛾2
 
 
∂𝑓𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0       𝑖𝑓    
𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾
1 + 𝛾2
< 𝑎                                 
                                                                                     
                  
                                      
∂𝑓𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0 
(3-34), (3-35), (3-36) 
 
Proof.  We explain the condition under which an increase in the degree of product 
substitutability and tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾) increases or decreases the 
fixed fee of the large retailer 𝑓𝐿
∗.  
By differentiating these equilibria of the fixed fee of the large retailer 𝑓𝐿
∗ with 
respect to the degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we gain the expression  𝜕𝑓𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ =
[𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾 − 𝑎(1 + 𝛾2)] [2(1 − 𝛾2)2]⁄ . Then, we solve 𝜕𝑓𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0  for 𝑎 
and obtain the equality  𝑎 = [𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ . In our model, when the 
inequality is satisfied 𝑎 < [𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ , we obtain the inequality 
𝜕𝑓𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0.  On the contrary, when the inequality is satisfied 
[𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2) < 𝑎⁄ , we obtain the inequality 𝜕𝑓𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0.  To keep 
positive outcomes, we assume the inequalities are satisfied 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐). 
Therefore, we obtain the proposition. □ 
 
From Proposition 5, the intuition is as follows. We consider the effect on the sales 
volume of each retailer based on the discussion of the above propositions. We show 
that the royalty of the large retailer decreases in the range of 𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) <  𝑎 <
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[𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄  for rent contracts (Proposition 3). In other words, the 
range indicates that the large retailer has been given preferential treatment by the 
developer by lowering commissions. Therefore, when 𝛾  becomes large, the large 
retailer is presented with the preferential treatment details from the developer. Then, 
we show that the sales volume of the large retailer increases because it is presented 
with the preferential treatment details from the developer (Proposition 4). 
Then, from Proposition 5, since the large retailer earns considerable revenue, the 
developer collects a fixed fee rent from the large retailer within the range of 𝑐 + 𝛾(1 −
𝑐) <  𝑎 < [2𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ . On the contrary, the small retailer behaves in 
the opposite direction in the equilibrium. First, as 𝛾 increases, the fixed fee rent of the 
small retailer tends to decline because the market is scaled down. From a different point 
of view, since the large retailer is given preferential treatment and the profits of the 
small retailer are reduced, the fixed fee rent of the small retailer is reduced. Therefore, 
we find that the fixed fee rent of the small retailer always decreases. 
 
 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
 
Figure 6. Effect on the fixed fee of 
the large retailer 
 𝜕𝑓𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0 
 𝜕𝑓𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
 
 𝜕𝑓𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0 
Figure 7. Effect on the fixed fee of 
the small retailer 
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We depict the result of Proposition 5 in Figure 6 and Figure 7. As shown in Figure 
6, the gray area is 𝜕𝑓𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0. We find the region in which the fixed fee of the large 
retailer 𝑓𝐿
∗  increases with the degree of product substitutability and the index of 
competition 𝛾. On the contrary, as shown in Figure 7, we find the region in which the 
fixed fee of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗ decreases with the degree of product substitutability 
and the index of competition 𝛾. 
By differentiating the ratio of the total royalty rent to the fixed fee rent of each 
retailer (𝑟𝐿
∗𝑝𝐿
∗𝑞𝐿
∗)/𝑓𝐿
∗ and (𝑟𝑆
∗𝑝𝑆
∗𝑞𝑆
∗)/𝑓𝑆
∗ in the equilibrium outcomes with respect to 
the degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 6 (The ratio of total royalty to the fixed fee for each retailer) 
As the degree of product substitutability and tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾) 
increase, the ratio of the total royalty rent of the small retailer to the fixed fee rent of 
the small retailer (𝑟𝑆
∗𝑝𝑆
∗𝑞𝑆
∗)/𝑓𝑆
∗ increases. Then, the conditions under which the region 
of the ratio of the total royalty rent of the large retailer to the fixed fee rent of the large 
retailer (𝑟𝐿
∗𝑝𝐿
∗𝑞𝐿
∗)/𝑓𝐿
∗ is positive or negative are as follows: 
 
{
  
 
  
 
                                                                            
∂
𝑟𝐿
∗𝑝𝐿
∗𝑞𝐿
∗
𝑓𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0      𝑖𝑓      
𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾
𝛾2 + 1
< 𝑎                         
    
∂
𝑟𝐿
∗𝑝𝐿
∗𝑞𝐿
∗
𝑓𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0       𝑖𝑓     𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) < 𝑎 <  
𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2 + 2𝛾
𝛾2 + 1
                                                                                     
 
                           
∂
𝑟𝑆
∗𝑝𝑆
∗𝑞𝑆
∗
𝑓𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0  
(3-37), (3-38), (3-39) 
 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. □ 
 
Hence, large and small retailers behave in the opposite direction in the areas of 
𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) <  𝑎 < [2𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ . However, in the lower right region 
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[2𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ < 𝑎 , both large and small retailers are positive and 
disadvantaged. In other words, there is a region where no retailer moves in the opposite 
direction, that is, both large and small retailers increase their royalties and become 
positive within [2𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)2] (1 + 𝛾2)⁄ < 𝑎. 
 
 
Therefore, at this stage, in the bottom right part, it is not clear whether the 
developer gives preferential treatment to which retailer. To clarify and discuss this issue 
about favorable treatment, it is impossible to clarify without analyzing the proportion 
of the difference in the royalty rent of each retailer. Then, we analyze the proportion of 
the royalty rent of each retailer. 
By differentiating the ratio of the royalty rent between the large and small retailers, 
𝑟𝐿
∗/𝑟𝑆
∗, and the ratio of the fixed fee rent between large and small retailers 𝑓𝐿
∗/𝑓𝑆
∗ at 
the equilibrium with respect to the degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we obtain the 
following proposition. 
Figure 8. Effect on the ratio of the total 
royalty rent to the fixed fee rent for the 
large retailer 
Figure 9. Effect on the ratio of the total 
royalty rent to the fixed fee rent for the 
small retailer 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
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∗
𝑓𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0   
 
∂
𝑟𝐿
∗𝑝𝐿
∗𝑞𝐿
∗
𝑓𝐿
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0   
 
∂
𝑟𝑆
∗𝑝𝑆
∗𝑞𝑆
∗
𝑓𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0   
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Proposition 7 (The ratio of each rent between large and small retailers)  
As the degree of product substitutability and tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾) 
increase and the ratio of the fixed fee rent between large and small retailers 𝑓𝐿
∗/𝑓𝑆
∗ 
increases. If 𝑎  is large enough to satisfy ?̃? < 𝑎 , then 𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝑟𝑆
∗⁄  is increasing in 𝛾 . 
Otherwise, 𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝑟𝑆
∗⁄  is decreasing in 𝛾. That is, 
{
  
 
  
 
                                                                            
∂
𝑟𝐿
∗
𝑟𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0        𝑖𝑓    ?̃? < 𝑎                         
      
∂
𝑟𝐿
∗
𝑟𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0       𝑖𝑓     𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) <  𝑎 < ?̃?
                                                                                      
 
       
∂
𝑓𝐿
∗
𝑓𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0                                                         
where 
𝑎 =
(1 − 𝛾) + 𝛾2(5 − 𝛾) − 𝑐(3 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝛾2)
√1 − 2𝛾 − 3𝛾2 + 𝑐2(5𝛾2 − 2𝛾 + 9) − 𝑐(3 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
2𝛾[2 − 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)]
= ?̃?. 
(3-40), (3-41), (3-42), (3-43) 
 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. By 
differentiating the ratio of the royalty rent between the large and small retailers, 𝑟𝐿
∗/𝑟𝑆
∗, 
in the equilibrium with respect to the degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we gain the 
expression  𝜕(𝑟𝐿
∗/𝑟𝑆
∗) 𝜕𝛾⁄ .  
∂
𝑟𝐿
∗
𝑟𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛾
=
2𝑐(𝑎 − 1)(1 + 𝛾)(
𝑎2𝛾[2 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛾] − 𝑎 [
(1 − 𝛾) + (5 − 𝛾)𝛾2
−𝑐(3 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝛾)2
]
+(1 − 𝛾)[2𝛾 − 𝛾2 − 𝑐(3 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝛾) − 𝑐2(1 − 𝛾)(5 + 𝛾)]
)
[(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]2[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]2
. 
(3-44) 
Then, we solve  𝜕(𝑟𝐿
∗/𝑟𝑆
∗) 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0 for 𝑎 and obtain the equality 𝑎 = ?̃?. When the 
inequality is satisfied ?̃? < 𝑎 , we obtain the inequality 𝜕(𝑟𝐿
∗/𝑟𝑆
∗) 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0.  On the 
contrary, when the inequality is satisfied 𝑐 + 𝛾(1 − 𝑐) < 𝑎 < ?̃? , we obtain the 
inequality 𝜕(𝑟𝐿
∗/𝑟𝑆
∗) 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0. To keep positive outcomes, we assume the inequalities 
are satisfied 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐). Therefore, we obtain the proposition. □ 
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As shown in Figure 10, the gray area is 𝜕(𝑟𝐿
∗/𝑟𝑆
∗) 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0. In the shaded area, we find 
the region where the large retailer is more disadvantaged than the small retailer. We 
also find the region where the proportion of the royalty for the large retailer increases 
when the degree of product substitutability is small in our model. 
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3.5. Concluding remarks 
 
When there are both large retailers and small retailers in one SC, the developer may 
attempt to make the competitive advantage of the small retailers stronger by decreasing 
their royalty and improving their quantity of products, thus intensifying the competition 
between large and small retailers in the whole SC. However, in our model, the 
developer gives preferential treatment to large retailers rather than intensifying the 
competition between large and small retailers by strengthening small retailers’ 
competitive advantage at the equilibrium. In other words, we found that the developer 
chooses an action to make the large retailers even stronger and increases their sales 
volume by decreasing their royalty to increase the profits of the developer. As a result, 
we found that the developer collects the rents with a greater ratio of the fixed fee from 
the large retailers and the rents with a greater ratio of the ad valorem royalty from the 
small retailers. 
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Chapter 4   Extended model 
Ad valorem royalties plus fixed fee model 
with demand uncertainty 
 
4.1. Introduction 
By using a model of the optimal two-part tariff licensing between a developer and 
retailers as the benchmark model, we focus on the effect of demand uncertainty in the 
extended model. We first explain the assumption of the extended model. In reality, 
many retailers selling many kinds of products in SCs have considerable information 
about customers. Specifically, we assume that the retailers of SCs accumulate 
knowledge and information about customers, such as the number of customers to come 
into the retail store, the general number of products they can sell by month, and what 
kinds of needs customers have in SCs. In practice, this means that retailers know 
customer demand. That is, at the stage of selling the products, we assume that large and 
small retailers know customer demand in a retail store and compete on quantity in SCs. 
On the contrary, since the developer does not have information about the customer 
demand of each retailer at the stage of making a contract, it is faced with only knowing 
customer demand probabilistically. In this paper, we build our extended model by 
considering the situation that customer demand in SCs is uncertain. 
First, we consider the ad valorem model with demand uncertainty. We expand the 
model from the one developed by Martín and Saracho (2016). In our paper, we adopt 
the two-part tariff method with ad valorem royalties used in Martín and Saracho (2016). 
In addition, we adopt the demand uncertainty method used in Creane and Miyagiwa 
(2008). In the benchmark model, we showed that the developer gives preferential 
treatment to large retailers rather than intensifying competition between large and small 
retailers by strengthening the competitive advantage of small retailers at the 
equilibrium. We also showed that the developer collects rents with a greater ratio of the 
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fixed fee rent from the large retailer and rents with a greater ratio of the ad valorem 
royalty from the small retailer. Moreover, in our extended model, we reveal the 
surprising phenomenon that this conclusion would be reversed in the situation with 
demand uncertainty. Specifically, although we found that the proportion of the fixed 
fee rent is higher for large retailers than for small retailers in our benchmark model, the 
extended model shows that the proportion of the fixed fee rent becomes greater for 
small retailers. Moreover, regarding important factors such as the relation of the fixed 
fee rent between large and small retailers, we consider that a conclusion that some 
region are reversed is worth discussing. In this way, we obtained the amazing results 
that the benchmarks and results change with a simple comparison. Moreover, in our 
model, when the degree of demand uncertainty is the same in each retailer, the result 
obtained is consistent with the benchmark model. In other words, we find that the fixed 
fee rent increases only if a factor widens the difference in the degree of demand 
uncertainty between large and small retailers.  
Furthermore, by using the comparative static analysis, we analyze what would 
happen when differentiated products become homogeneous products and the 
competition between large and small retailers becomes more intense in SCs. Then, if 
the retailers in SCs become even more competitive, it could decrease the profit of the 
developer. It is confirmed by using the benchmark model that the profit of the developer 
would decline as previously when approaching homogeneous products, it reduces the 
profit of the developer at the equilibrium. This is a general result. However, in our 
extended model, we discover a counterintuitive result that the profit of the developer 
would increase under demand uncertainty in SCs. In other words, when the degree of 
product substitutability increases and similar retail tenants carry similar products in an 
SC, there is an increase in the profit of the developer. Then, amazingly, when the degree 
of demand uncertainty in the whole SC increases, the profit of the developer increases 
more at the equilibrium. Furthermore, we obtain similar results for social welfare under 
uncertainty at the equilibrium. This is one of the most interesting results in our extended 
model. In other words, we find that increasing demand uncertainty for the whole SC is 
desirable for the developer in our model. 
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4.2. Model 
We assume an SC where a developer determines the royalty of the rent to the two types 
of retailers. To sell products, each retailer must sign lease contracts with the developer. 
Consider the developer (D) that uses a two-part tariff licensing mechanism to contract 
with each retailer. We call the retailer of the large efficient company the large retailer 
(L) and the other of the small inefficient company the small retailer (S). Then, each 
retailer sells the sales volume 𝑞𝑖 (𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝑆) . The retailers get the product from 
manufacturers except the developer. Then, we assume a cost-competitive setting such 
as that in the apparel industry. Each retailer’s rent depends on its sales of tenant  𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖. 
For simplicity, we assume that 𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 is the rent according to royalty 𝑟𝑖 and the sales 
of tenant 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖  that retailer 𝑖  attains. Then, 𝑓𝑖  denotes the fixed fee rent of each 
retailer. For simplicity, the marginal cost is given by 𝑐 and we assume that 𝑐 is a 
sufficiently small positive value. Specifically, we explain what kind of situation this 
assumes. We consider the situation that the willingness to pay of consumers changes 
depending on the differences in retail brands and brand image for consumers. In this 
case, it is a natural setting to assume little difference in the goods among the retailers. 
Then, we identify that the cost has no effect on the result in our model. 
Begin with demand uncertainty. Assume that the demand intercept 𝐴𝑖 is 
distributed with mean and variance 𝜎𝑖
2; for simplicity, the mean is zero. We assume that 
𝜎𝑖 is the degree of the demand uncertainty for each retailer. In our later discussion, we 
assume that 𝜎  is the degree of the demand uncertainty for the whole SC. The 
distribution is such that outputs are always positive in the equilibrium. To keep positive 
outcomes, we assume that 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐). 
The utility maximization problem is 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝐿 ,𝑞𝑆,𝑚
 𝑈(𝑞𝐿, 𝑞𝑆, 𝑚) = (𝐴𝐿 + 1)𝑞𝐿 + (𝐴𝑆 + 𝑎)𝑞𝑆 −
1
2
(𝑞𝐿
2 + 𝑞𝑆
2) − 𝛾𝑞𝐿𝑞𝑆 +𝑚,  
       𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 + 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 +𝑚 ≤ 𝐼,  
  (4-1) 
where 0 < 𝑎 < 1  and 0 < 𝛾 < 1 , and the degree of product substitutability is 
measured by 𝛾. When 𝛾 → 1, the goods are perfect substitutes and for 𝛾 → 0, the 
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goods are unrelated, that is, we use 𝛾 (the degree of product substitutability) as a 
measure of the competition of the retail market. If 𝛾  is large, the products are 
homogenized and the competition of the retail market becomes intense. Otherwise, if 
𝛾  is small, the products are differentiated and the competition of the retail market 
becomes moderate. Considering the above assumption, we assume that the profit 
function of the developer consequently is concave. We obtain the condition of the 
parameter that satisfies the second-order condition. Then, combined with the condition 
to keep positive outcomes, we obtain the following the conditions: 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐). 
When 𝑚 is the amount of the numeraire good, 𝑝𝑖 is the price of the retailer’s product, 
and 𝐼 is the income for the consumer. We employ the utility function form represented 
by Equation (4-1) for the following reason. If the product quality supplied by a retailer 
is zero, a consumer has no incentive to buy the product. Hence, our utility function is 
consistent with consumer behavior.  
Assume that there are two asymmetric retailers competing in a market such as 
Cournot duopolists with horizontally differentiated products. This product 
differentiation, as assumed in the paper, may be due to each retailer of different brand 
names. From the first-order conditions of the utility maximization problem, the inverse 
demand functions that the two retailers face are given by 
𝑝𝐿 = 𝐴𝐿 + 1 − 𝑞𝐿 − 𝛾𝑞𝑆,          (4-2) 
𝑝𝑆 = 𝐴𝑆 + 𝑎 − 𝑞𝑆 − 𝛾𝑞𝐿.                    (4-3) 
The profit function of the developer is given as 
𝜋𝐷 = 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 + 𝑓𝐿 + 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 + 𝑓𝑆.                (4-4) 
The profit function of retailer 𝑖 is given as 
 𝜋𝐿 = 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 − 𝑓𝐿,    𝜋𝑆 = 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆 − 𝑓𝑆.      
(4-5), (4-6) 
Consumer surplus 𝐶𝑆 = (𝑞𝐿
2 + 2𝛾𝑞𝐿𝑞𝑆 + 𝑞𝑆
2)/2 and social welfare 𝑆𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 +
𝜋𝐷 + 𝜋𝐿 + 𝜋𝑆. We next delineate the timeline of a series of decisions made by the 
players comprising the supply chain. The setting of the assumption and timing of the 
game are described as follows. We consider a two-stage game. In stage one, the 
developer chooses the ad valorem royalty and fixed fee rent of each retailer, 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑓𝑖. 
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In stage two, each retailer independently and simultaneously chooses its sales, 𝑞𝑖. 
In the model, we assume that the retailer needs to pay the fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖 
regardless of the sales volume 𝑞𝑖 . Regarding this point, when contracting with the 
developer in stage one, retailers have a contract that they have to pay a fixed fee rent 
to the developer when they open a store in the SC. In other words, the fixed fee can be 
said to be the cost for participation in the SC. Since the fixed fee rent of retailer 𝑓𝑖 has 
already been determined when each retailer decides 𝑞𝑖, retailers must pay the fixed fee 
rent 𝑓𝑖 without depending on any sales volume 𝑞𝑖. Specifically, since we assume that 
we do not think of a situation where retailers do not have to pay the fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 when 
they do not sell in SCs, the retailers have to pay the fixed fee rent  𝑓𝑖  even in any 
financial condition. In other words, retailers have already paid the fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖 as 
a sunk cost to a developer on a contract basis. 
From a game procedure point of view, the retailer decides whether to contract or 
reject at the stage of concluding the contract. In stage one, the developer decides the 
fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖 and royalty 𝑟𝑖 and presents a contract to retailers. Then, the retailers 
receive a contract agreement from the developer, calculate the fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖, and 
sign a contract. At that time, because retailers have already paid the fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖 to 
a developer, in the second stage the retailer decides the sales volume in the situations 
that the fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖 is a sunk cost. 
Then, we assume that 𝐴𝐿 and 𝐴𝑆 appear as random variables and that each of 
the retailers knows its realization value. As its interpretation, this means that retailers 
can reliably know information on customers at the point of sale in the retail store. Each 
of the retailers sees 𝐴𝐿 and 𝐴𝑆 as random variables in the first stage. Neither large 
nor small retailers know this specific value, but both know the probability distribution. 
In other words, the retailers know that the mean of the probability distribution is zero 
and the variance is 𝜎𝑖
2. Figure 11 illustrates the timeline of events. The model is solved 
with the use of backward induction along the timeline to derive the subgame perfect 
equilibrium in this dynamic game. 
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The developer chooses the 
royalty and fixed fee of each 
retailer, 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑓𝑖  
Each retailer independently 
and simultaneously 
chooses its sales, 𝑞𝑖 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
Figure 11. Timeline of events. 
 50 
 
Table 3. Nomenclature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑞𝐿  sales quantity of the large retailer 
 𝑞𝑆  sales quantity of the small retailer 
 𝑝𝐿  price of the large retailer 
 𝑝𝑆  price of the small retailer 
 𝑟𝐿  royalty of the large retailer 
 𝑟𝑆  royalty of the small retailer 
 𝑓𝐿  fixed fee rent of the large retailer 
 𝑓𝑆  fixed fee rent of the small retailer 
 𝜋𝐷  profit of the developer 
 𝜋𝐿  profit of the large retailer 
 𝜋𝑆  profit of the small retailer 
 𝐶𝑆  consumer surplus 
 𝑆𝑊  social welfare 
 𝐴𝐿  random variable of the large retailer 
 𝐴𝑆  random variable of the small retailer 
  𝜎𝐿    degree of demand uncertainty for the large retailer 
  𝜎𝑆    degree of demand uncertainty for the small retailer 
  𝜎     degree of demand uncertainty for the whole SC 
 𝑎   intercept of the inverse demand function 
 𝑐    marginal cost of the retailers  
 𝛾   degree of product substitutability 
 **    superscript for the equilibrium of the new model  
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4.3. Calculating the equilibrium 
In this section, we identify the subgame perfect equilibrium. In the second stage, each 
retailer knows the value of 𝐴𝑆  and 𝐴𝐿  and chooses its sales quantity. The 
maximization problem for the large retailer is 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝐿
[ 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 − 𝑓𝐿 ].                 (4-7) 
The maximization problem for the small retailer is stated as 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝑆
[ 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆 − 𝑓𝑆 ].                  (4-8) 
Note that retailers have already paid the fixed fee rent 𝑓𝑖 as a sunk cost to a developer. 
The first-order conditions (𝜕𝜋𝐿/𝜕𝑞𝐿 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜕𝜋𝑆/𝜕𝑞𝑆 = 0) are derived as 
𝑞𝐿 =
2(1 − 𝑟𝑆)[𝐴𝐿(1 − 𝑟𝐿) − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝐿 + 1] − 𝛾(1 − 𝑟𝐿)[(𝑎 + 𝐴𝑆)(1 − 𝑟𝑆) − 𝑐]
(4 − 𝛾2)(1 − 𝑟𝐿)(1 − 𝑟𝑆)
, 
𝑞𝑆 =
2(1 − 𝑟𝐿)[(𝑎 + 𝐴𝑆)(1 − 𝑟𝑆) − 𝑐] − 𝛾(1 − 𝑟𝑆)[𝐴𝐿(1 − 𝑟𝐿) − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝐿 + 1]
(4 − 𝛾2)(1 − 𝑟𝐿)(1 − 𝑟𝑆)
. 
(4-9), (4-10) 
By substituting this outcome into the expected profit of the developer, we have the 
maximization problem of the expected profit of the developer as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 
𝑟𝐿 ,𝑟𝑆,𝑓𝐿 ,𝑓𝑆
𝐸 [  𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 + 𝑓𝐿 + 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 + 𝑓𝑆  ].                     
 𝑠. 𝑡.   𝐸 [ 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 ] − 𝑓𝐿 ≥ 0, 
      𝐸  [ 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆 ] − 𝑓𝑆 ≥ 0. 
(4-11) 
As the objective function is an increasing function of  𝑓𝑖 and the developer takes 
the value of the largest fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 within the range that satisfies the participation 
constraints, it is the optimal strategy for the developer to determine the value of the 
fixed fee 𝑓𝑖. Then, since the value of the fixed fee  𝑓𝑖 should be determined to bind 
with the participation constraints, the value of the fixed fee  𝑓𝑖 is as follows: 
{
  𝑓𝐿 = 𝐸  [ 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑟𝐿𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 ],         
  𝑓𝑆 = 𝐸  [ 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆 ].         
     
(4-12), (4-13) 
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By substituting (4-12) and (4-13) into (4-11), we can write the expected profit 
maximization in the form that also includes the participation constraints. In other words, 
we can rewrite the developer’s expectation profit maximization problem as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 
𝑟𝐿,𝑟𝑆
𝐸 [ 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 − 𝑐𝑞𝐿 + 𝑝𝑆𝑞𝑆 − 𝑐𝑞𝑆 ].    
(4-14) 
Here, the developer cannot present a contract with the fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 and royalty 𝑟𝑖 
depending on the realization value of demand 𝐴𝑖. In other words, since the developer 
cannot write the contracts as a function of the realized value of demand 𝐴𝑖, we assume 
that the developer cannot schedule the realization value of demand 𝐴𝑖  and its 
corresponding payment schedule. That is, it is not considered in our model that the 
fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 and royalty 𝑟𝑖 vary depending on the realization value of demand 𝐴𝑖.  
The first-order condition  (𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷]/𝜕𝑟𝐿 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷]/𝜕𝑟𝑆 = 0) in this stage 
yields 
𝑟𝐿
∗∗ =
𝛾[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
, 
𝑟𝑆
∗∗ =
𝛾[(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
, 
 (4-15), (4-16) 
where the variables with superscript ** represent the equilibrium values. Then, the 
outcomes of the royalty corresponds to the benchmark model. 
By solving the above equation, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes and provide 
the results in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Equilibrium outcomes 
 Equilibrium 
𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 
𝑎(𝑎 − 2[𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]) + 2𝑐(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑐) + 1
4(1 − 𝛾2)
+
(4 + 𝛾2)(𝜎𝐿
2 + 𝜎𝑆
2)
(4 − 𝛾2)2
 
𝐸[𝑞𝐿
∗∗] 
(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)
2(1 − 𝛾2)
 
𝑞𝐿
∗∗ 
1
4
(
8𝐴𝐿
4 − 𝛾2
−
4𝐴𝑆𝛾
4 − 𝛾2
+
2[(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
1 − 𝛾2
) 
𝐸[𝑞𝑆
∗∗] 
(𝑎 − 𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)
2(1 − 𝛾2)
 
𝑞𝑆
∗∗ 
1
4
(
8𝐴𝑆
4 − 𝛾2
−
4𝐴𝐿𝛾
4 − 𝛾2
+
2[(𝑎 − 𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
1 − 𝛾2
) 
𝑟𝐿
∗∗ 
𝛾[(𝑎 − 𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
 
𝑟𝑆
∗∗ 
𝛾[(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)
 
𝑓𝐿
∗∗ 
𝑐[(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]2
2(1 − 𝛾2)[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
+
2𝑐(1 − 𝛾2)(4𝜎𝐿
2 + 𝛾2𝜎𝑆
2)
(4 − 𝛾2)𝟐[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
 
𝑓𝑆
∗∗ 
𝑐[(𝑎 − 𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]2
2(1 − 𝛾2)[𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
+
2𝑐(1 − 𝛾2)(4𝜎𝑆
2 + 𝛾2𝜎𝐿
2)
(4 − 𝛾2)𝟐[𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
 
𝐸[𝐶𝑆∗∗] 
𝑎(𝑎 − 2[𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]) + 2𝑐(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑐) + 1
8(1 − 𝛾2)
+
(4 − 3𝛾2)(𝜎𝐿
2 + 𝜎𝑆
2)
2(4 − 𝛾2)2
 
𝐸[𝑆𝑊∗∗] 
3𝑎[(𝑎 − 2[𝛾 + 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]) + 2𝑐(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑐) + 1]
8(1 − 𝛾2)
+
(12 − 𝛾2)(𝜎𝐿
2 + 𝜎𝑆
2)
2(4 − 𝛾2)2
 
The superscript ** denotes the equilibrium for the extended model. 𝐶𝑆  is 
consumer surplus. 𝑆𝑊 is social welfare. 
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4.4. Equilibrium and comparative statics 
This paper compares the contract of the rent system by means of the proportion of a 
fixed fee rent with the contract of the rent system by means of the proportion of the ad 
valorem royalties in a Cournot duopoly model under demand uncertainty. By 
differentiating the relationships of the fixed fee rent for each retailer and the fixed fee 
rent of the small retailer with respect to the degree of demand uncertainty for the small 
retailer, we obtain the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1 (Effect of the degree of demand uncertainty for small retailer) 
As the degree of demand uncertainty for the small retailer as variance (an increase in 
𝜎𝑆
2) increase, we show that the relationships of the fixed fee rent of each retailer 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ −
𝑓𝑆
∗∗ decreases. In addition, as the degree of demand uncertainty for the small retailer 
as variance (an increase in 𝜎𝑆
2) increase, the fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ 
increases: 
𝜕(𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗)
𝜕𝜎𝑆
2
= −
2𝑐(1 − 𝛾2)[𝛾[𝑎(4 + 𝛾3) − 𝛾(4 + 𝛾)] + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)2]
(4 − 𝛾2)2[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)][𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
< 0, 
𝜕𝑓𝑠
∗∗
𝜕𝜎𝑆
2 =
8𝑐(1 − 𝛾2)
(𝛾2 − 4)2[𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
> 0. 
(4-17), (4-18) 
 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. □ 
 
From Lemma 1, the intuition is as follows. When the variance of the small retailer 𝜎𝑆
2 
increases, we show that the relationship of the fixed fee rent of each retailer is negative 
𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ < 0 in the equilibrium. In other words, when the variance of the small 
retailer 𝜎𝑆
2 decreases per unit, we show that the relationship of the fixed fee rent of 
each retailer is positive 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ > 0 in the equilibrium. As identified above, since 
the variance of the small retailer 𝜎𝑆
2 is a decreasing function, we show that the fixed 
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fee rent of the large retailer 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ decreases more than the fixed fee of the small retailer 
𝑓𝑆
∗∗ when demand uncertainty increases at the equilibrium.  
Next, in order to supplement this discussion, we differentiate these equilibria of 
the fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ with respect to the variance of the small 
retailer 𝜎𝑆
2. Then, we show that the numerator of this equation 𝜕𝑓𝑆
∗∗ 𝜕𝜎𝑆
2⁄  is negative 
and the denominator is also negative in the equilibrium. That is, we obtain the 
inequality 𝜕𝑓𝑆
∗∗ 𝜕𝜎𝑆
2⁄ > 0. Therefore, we find that as the variance of the small retailer 
𝜎𝑆
2 increases, the fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ increases in the equilibrium. 
In other words, from the lemma, we find that the developer tends to collect the fixed 
fee rent from retailers in SCs with a high degree of demand uncertainty. 
By differentiating the fixed fee rent of the small retailer with respect to the 
intercept of the inverse demand function of the small retailer 𝑎 , we obtain the 
following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2 (Effect of intercept of inverse demand function of small retailer) 
As the intercept of the inverse demand function of the small retailer 𝑎 increases, the 
fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ increases: 
 
 𝜕𝑓𝑠
∗∗
𝜕𝑎
> 0. 
(4-19) 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. □ 
 
On the basis of the lemma, we take the debate one step further in the next 
proposition. We explain in the next proposition that we discovered that there is a region 
reverses the benchmark with respect to the proportion of the rents of SCs of the most 
important in our paper. In this study, we obtained the results that the benchmarks and 
results change with a simple comparison. We compare the ad valorem royalty of the 
large retailer 𝑟𝐿
∗∗ with the royalty of the small retailer 𝑟𝑆
∗∗ and the fixed fee rent of the 
large retailer  𝑓𝐿
∗∗  with the fixed fee rent of the small retailer  𝑓𝑆
∗∗ . By solving the 
inequalities of the equilibrium, we find that 𝑟𝐿
∗∗ < 𝑟𝑆
∗∗. 
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Proposition 8 (The fixed fee and royalty of large and small retailers) 
We show that the conditions of the relationship of the fixed fee rent of large and small 
retailers, 𝑓𝐿
∗∗, 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ , are as follows. If 𝜎𝑆
2  is large enough to satisfy ?̃? < 𝜎𝑆
2 , then 
 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ is decreasing. Otherwise, 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ is increasing. That is, 
{
  𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ > 0        𝑖𝑓    ?̃? > 𝜎𝑆
2  
 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ < 0        𝑖𝑓    ?̃? < 𝜎𝑆
2 
 
 𝑟𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑟𝑆
∗∗ < 0                            
where  
𝜎𝑆
2 =
𝑐(2 − 𝛾)[(1 − 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)]2[(1 − 𝑎2)(2 − 𝛾)2 + 4(1 − 𝛾2)𝜎𝐿
2]
+𝛾[(1 − 𝑎3)[1 − 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)](4 − 𝛾2)2 + 3𝑎2𝛾(4 − 𝛾2)2
−𝑎𝛾[3(4 − 𝛾2)2 + 4(1 + 𝛾)(4 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛾)2𝜎𝐿
2]
+4(1 − 𝛾)2(1 + 𝛾)(4 + 𝛾3)𝜎𝐿
2] − (1 − 𝑎)𝑐2(2 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝛾)2(4 + 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)2
4(1 − 𝛾)2(1 + 𝛾)[𝑎𝛾(4 + 𝛾3) − 𝛾2(4 + 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)2]
= ?̃?. 
(4-20), (4-21), (4-22), (4-23) 
 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. As we 
calculate the difference between the two equilibria of the ad valorem royalties of large 
and small retailers, 𝑟𝐿
∗∗ and 𝑟𝑆
∗∗, we find 𝑟𝐿
∗∗ < 𝑟𝑆
∗∗. On the contrary, as we calculate 
the difference between the two equilibria of the fixed fee rent of large and small retailers, 
𝑓𝐿
∗∗ and 𝑓𝑆
∗∗, we gain the expression 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗. 
𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ 
= (
𝑐[(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]2
2(1 − 𝛾2)[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
+
2𝑐(1 − 𝛾2)(4𝜎𝐿
2 + 𝛾2𝜎𝑆
2)
(4 − 𝛾2)𝟐[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
) 
−(
𝑐[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]2
2(1 − 𝛾2)[𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
+
2𝑐(1 − 𝛾2)(4𝜎𝑆
2 + 𝛾2𝜎𝐿
2)
(4 − 𝛾2)𝟐[𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
). 
(4-24) 
Then, we solve 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ = 0  for  𝜎𝑆
2  and obtain the equality 𝜎𝑆
2 = ?̃? . When the 
inequality is satisfied ?̃? < 𝜎𝑆
2, we obtain the inequality 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ < 0. On the contrary, 
when the inequality is satisfied ?̃? > 𝜎𝑆
2, we obtain the inequality  𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ > 0. To 
keep positive outcomes, we assume the inequalities are satisfied 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐). 
Therefore, we obtain the proposition. □ 
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The intuition is as follows. From this proposition, in the extended model of this 
paper, we discovered that although demand uncertainty is taken into consideration, the 
conclusion of the benchmark model on the royalty rent of the large retailer is retained. 
In other words, we found that the result on the relationship of the royalty of each retailer 
in the equilibrium is retained. Similar to the benchmark model, we showed that the 
small retailer has a higher royalty rent than the large retailer in terms of the ad valorem 
royalty rent in the equilibrium. On the contrary, with respect to the ad valorem royalty 
rent in the equilibrium, we gained the result that the developer always collects a fixed 
fee rent from large retailers in the benchmark model. 
However, in our extended model, we revealed the surprising phenomenon that this 
conclusion would be reversed in the situation with demand uncertainty. Specifically, 
although we found that the proportion of the fixed fee rent is higher for large retailers 
than for small retailers in our benchmark model, we found that the region where the 
proportion of the fixed fee rent becomes greater for small retailers in the extended 
model. Furthermore, under demand uncertainty, we found that when the difference in 
demand uncertainty between large and small retailers is expanded, the developer would 
increase the proportion of the fixed fee rent for both large and small retailers. 
Next, to simplify the discussion of our model, we gradually expand the difference 
in the degree of the demand uncertainty of the retailers by means of assigning a definite 
numerical value to the parameter. That is, we describe concrete values of 𝜎𝐿 and 𝜎𝑆, 
which are the degrees of the demand uncertainty for retailers, as shown graphically in 
Figure 12. Then, we assume that 𝑐 is fixed to a small value close to zero, which has 
no effect on the result. We depict the above explanation of Proposition 8 in Figure 12. 
As shown in the figure, the gray area is 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ > 0. In the non-shaded area, we 
find the region in which the difference between the two equilibria of the fixed fee rent 
of large and small retailers is negative 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ < 0  with the degree of product 
substitutability and the index of competition 𝛾. 
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As shown in this figure, we assume the situations where the values of demand 
uncertainty between large and small retailers are different. Specifically, when 
considering the actual SC, the large retailer is more likely to have customer demand 
Figure 12. Difference in the fixed fee rent 
(𝑐 = 0.1, 𝜎𝐿 = 0.1, 𝜎𝑆 = 0.1) 
(𝑐 = 0.1, 𝜎𝐿 = 0.1, 𝜎𝑆 = 0.5) 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
 
𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ < 0 
𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ > 0 
𝑓𝐿
∗∗ − 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ > 0 
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and the degree of demand uncertainty is lower than that for the small retailer in SCs. In 
other words, we assume a situation where the fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ 
has a greater degree of demand uncertainty. Since the benchmark model is the case 
when the degree of demand uncertainty is zero, the extended model overlaps the 
benchmark in a certain area. Then, in our model, the larger the value of 𝑎, the larger is 
the region in which the relation of the fixed fee rent of large and small retailers is 
reversed. Increasing the value of 𝑎 means that the competitive advantage of large and 
small retailers is similar. In other words, it comes closer to a company that has similar 
competitiveness. 
Next, we explore why such a region reverses the benchmark model in this way. 
From Lemma 1, we found that as the variance of the small retailer 𝜎𝑆
2 increases, the 
fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ increases in the equilibrium. In addition, we 
found that the developer tends to collect a fixed fee rent from retailers in SCs with a 
high degree of demand uncertainty. On the contrary, in our model, when the degree of 
demand uncertainty is the same in each retailer, we found that the result is consistent 
with the benchmark model. In other words, the fixed fee rent increases only if a factor 
widens the difference in the degree of demand uncertainty between the large retailer 
and small retailer. 
Furthermore, from Lemma 2, we further discuss this result. To derive this result, 
it is important to consider the movement that inverts when the value of 𝑎 is large. 
From Lemma 2, by differentiating 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ with respect to 𝑎, we show that the fixed fee 
rent of a small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ is an increasing function of 𝑎. In other words, in our model, 
as the value of 𝑎 gets larger, the fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ tends to be 
larger. Therefore, for all these reasons, as the value of 𝑎 and the variance of the small 
retailer 𝜎𝑆
2  increase, there is a considerable rise in the fixed fee rent of the small 
retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗, which is an increasing function of the value of 𝑎 and the variance of the 
small retailer 𝜎𝑆
2. As a result, in our model, the fixed fee rent of the small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗ 
overtakes the fixed fee rent of the large retailer 𝑓𝐿
∗∗ in the equilibrium. 
As stated above, in this proposition, we discovered a region that reverses the 
benchmark with respect to the proportion of the rents of SCs. Moreover, regarding 
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important factors such as the relation of the fixed fee rent between large and small 
retailers, we found that some regions are reversed. In this way, we found that the 
benchmarks and results change with a simple comparison. Our analysis shows that 
when demand uncertainty is expanded in SCs, that is, when a developer attracts a 
retailer with a high degree of demand uncertainty such as opening a new tenant or 
rolling out new products, selling a new product for new customers in SCs, it would be 
better for the developer to increase the proportion of the fixed fee rent. 
By differentiating the profit of the developer with respect to the degree of demand 
uncertainty for the small retailer, we obtain the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 3 (Effect of demand uncertainty on the profit of developer) 
As the degree of demand uncertainty as variance (an increase in 𝜎𝑆
2) increase, we show 
that the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] increases: 
∂𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗]
𝜕𝜎𝑆
2 =
4 + 𝛾2
(4 − 𝛾2)2
> 0. 
(4-25) 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. □ 
 
We differentiate the equilibria of the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] with respect 
to the variance of the small retailer 𝜎𝑆
2 . Then, we show that the numerator of this 
equation 𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝜎𝑆
2⁄  is positive and the denominator of this equation 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝜎𝑆
2⁄  is also positive in the equilibrium. That is, we obtain the inequality 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝜎𝑆
2⁄ > 0. Therefore, we find that as the variance of the small retailer 𝜎𝑆
2 
increases, the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] increases in the equilibrium. In other 
words, from the lemma, we show that when the degree of demand uncertainty of small 
retailers increases, the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] increases more in our model. 
By differentiating the profit of the developer with respect to the intercept of the 
inverse demand function of the small retailer, we obtain the following lemma. 
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Lemma 4 (Effect of competitiveness on the profit of developer) 
As the intercept of the inverse demand function of the small retailer 𝑎 increases, we 
show that the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] increases: 
 𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗]
𝜕𝑎
=
𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝛾(1 − 𝑐)
2(1 − 𝛾2)
> 0. 
(4-26) 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. □ 
 
We differentiate the equilibria of the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] with respect 
to 𝑎. Then, we show that the numerator of this equation 𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝑎⁄  is positive and 
the denominator of this equation 𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝑎⁄  is also positive in the equilibrium. That 
is, we obtain the inequality 𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝑎⁄ > 0. Therefore, we find that as the value of 
𝑎 increases, the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] increases in the equilibrium. 
By differentiating the profit of the developer with respect to the degree of demand 
uncertainty for the whole SC, we obtain the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 5 (Effect of demand uncertainty for SC on the profit of developer) 
As the degree of demand uncertainty for the whole SC (an increase in 𝜎) increases, we 
show that the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] increases: 
 ∂𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗]
𝜕𝜎
=
4(4 + 𝛾2)𝜎
(4 − 𝛾2)2
> 0. 
(4-27) 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. □ 
 
For our later discussion, we consider the demand uncertainty for the whole SC. 
As a simplification, we assume that 𝜎 = 𝜎𝐿 = 𝜎𝑆. We differentiate the equilibria of the 
profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] with respect to the demand uncertainty for the whole 
SC 𝜎. Then, we obtain the inequality 𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝜎⁄ > 0. Therefore, we find that as the 
demand uncertainty for the whole SC 𝜎 increases, the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 
increases at the equilibrium. In other words, when the demand uncertainty for the whole 
SC increases, the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] increases more in our model. 
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By differentiating the profit of the developer with respect to the degree of product 
substitutability, we obtain the following proposition. We consider the demand 
uncertainty for the whole SC, that is, we assume that 𝜎 = 𝜎𝐿 = 𝜎𝑆 . 
 
Proposition 9 (Effect of tougher competition on the profit of developer) 
The condition under which increasing the degree of product substitutability and 
tougher competition (an increase in 𝛾 ) increases or decreases the profit of the 
developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] is as follows. If 𝜎2 is large enough to satisfy ?̃? < 𝜎2, then  𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 
is increasing in 𝛾. Otherwise, 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] is decreasing in 𝛾. That is, 
{
 
 
 
 
                                                                            
∂𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗]
𝜕𝛾
> 0        𝑖𝑓    ?̃? < 𝜎2         
  
∂𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗]
𝜕𝛾
< 0       𝑖𝑓     ?̃? > 𝜎2           
                                                                                      
 
where                                                  (4-28), (4-29) 
𝜎2 =
[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)][(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)](4 − 𝛾2)3
8𝛾(1 − 𝛾2)2(12 + 𝛾2)
=  ?̃?. 
(4-30) 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. By 
differentiating the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] in the equilibrium with respect to the 
degree of product substitutability 𝛾, we gain the expression  𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝛾⁄ : 
    
∂𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗]
𝜕𝛾
= −
[𝑎 − 𝛾 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)][(1 − 𝑎𝛾) − 𝑐(1 − 𝛾)]
2(1 − 𝛾2)2
+
4𝛾(12 + 𝛾2)𝜎2
(4 − 𝛾2)3
. 
(4-31) 
Then, we solve  𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0  for  𝜎2  and obtain the equality  𝜎2 = ?̃? . In our 
model, when the inequality is satisfied ?̃? < 𝜎2 , we obtain the inequality 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0. On the contrary, when the inequality is satisfied ?̃? > 𝜎2, we obtain 
the inequality  𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0.  To keep positive outcomes, we assume the 
inequalities are satisfied 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐). Therefore, we obtain the proposition. □ 
 
From the proposition, the intuition is as follows. First, if the retailers in SCs 
become even more competitive, it could decrease the profit of the developer. In the 
benchmark model, we found that when the degree of product substitutability increases, 
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the profit of the developer decreases. In other words, we discovered that the retailers in 
SCs become even more competitive, which decreases the profit of the developer. 
Therefore, the benchmark model confirmed that the profit of the developer would 
decline as previously when approaching homogeneous products, it reduces the profit 
of the developer at the equilibrium. This is a general result. However, from this 
proposition, in our extended model, we revealed the surprising phenomenon that this 
conclusion would be reversed in the situation with demand uncertainty. In other words, 
we discovered a counterintuitive result that the profit of the developer would increase 
under demand uncertainty. Specifically, when the degree of product substitutability 
increases and similar retail tenants carry similar products in an SC, there is an increase 
in the profit of the developer. Then, as we discuss later, when the degree of the demand 
uncertainty of the whole SC increases, the profit of the developer increases more. This 
is one of the most interesting results in our extended model. 
Next, to simplify the discussion of our model, we gradually expand the difference 
in the degree of the demand uncertainty of the retailers by means of assigning a definite 
numerical value to the parameter. In this proposition, since we analyze the profit of the 
developer, we consider the degree of demand uncertainty for the whole SC. We assume 
that 𝜎 is the degree of demand uncertainty for the whole SC. That is, we describe 
concrete values of 𝜎, which are the degrees of the demand uncertainty for retailers as 
shown graphically in Figure 13. Then, we assume that 𝑐 is fixed to a small value close 
to zero, which has no effect on the result. We depict the result of this proposition in 
Figure 13. As shown in the figure, the gray area is  𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0. We find the region 
in which the profit of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] increases with the degree of product 
substitutability and the index of competition 𝛾. 
As shown in this figure, to give clear and detailed explanations about the effect of 
demand uncertainty for the whole SC, we assume that 𝜎 = 𝜎𝐿 = 𝜎𝑆. Specifically, when 
considering the actual SC, we consider that the whole SC faces demand uncertainty. In 
other words, we assume that the degree of the demand uncertainty of the whole SC 
grows progressively larger. Since the benchmark model is the case when the degree of 
uncertainty is zero, the extended model overlaps the benchmark in a certain area. 
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However, from this proposition, in our extended model, we revealed the surprising 
phenomenon that this conclusion would be reversed in the situation with demand 
uncertainty. That is, in our extended model, we discovered a counterintuitive result that 
the profit of the developer would increase under demand uncertainty in SCs. In other 
words, when the degree of product substitutability increases and similar retail tenants 
carry similar products in an SC, there is an increase in the profit of the developer. 
Moreover, from a managerial perspective, we found that the developer should 
attract the retailer with the demand uncertainty in the whole SC and similar retail 
tenants (e.g., tenants that sell similar quality products) to the SC. Furthermore, this 
paper makes a major contribution to the better management of the SC by indicating that 
when a developer opens an SC in areas where demand uncertainty is relatively high, it 
may be profitable for developers to attract retailers that produce a similar product to 
other retailers, have a similar consumer need, or sell a product that has a similar quality 
or value. 
Some outcomes 
are negative 
 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗]
𝜕𝛾
> 0 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗]
𝜕𝛾
< 0 
Figure 13. Profit of the developer 
𝜎 = 0.1 
 
𝜎 = 0.7 
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By differentiating these equilibrium outcomes with respect to variance as the 
degree of demand uncertainty for the whole SC (𝜎2) increases, we obtain the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 10 (Effect of tougher competition on the outcomes) 
When the variance as the degree of demand uncertainty for the whole SC (an increase 
in 𝜎2) increase, the fixed fee rent of the large retailer 𝑓𝐿
∗∗, the fixed fee rent of the 
small retailer 𝑓𝑆
∗∗, consumer surplus 𝐸[𝐶𝑆∗∗], social welfare 𝐸[𝑆𝑊∗∗], and the profit 
of the developer 𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗] increase in the equilibrium: 
𝜕𝑓𝐿
∗∗
𝜕𝜎2
=
2𝑐(1 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)(4 + 𝛾2)
(4 − 𝛾2)2[𝛾(𝑎 − 𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
> 0,   
  
𝜕𝑓𝑆
∗∗
𝜕𝜎2
=
2𝑐(1 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)(4 + 𝛾2)
(4 − 𝛾2)2[𝛾(1 − 𝑎𝛾) + 𝑐(2 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝛾)]
> 0,  
𝜕𝐸[𝐶𝑆∗∗]
𝜕𝜎2
=
4 − 3𝛾2
(4 − 𝛾2)2
 > 0,     
𝜕𝐸[𝑆𝑊∗∗]
𝜕𝜎2
=
12 − 𝛾2
(4 − 𝛾2)2
> 0, 
∂𝐸[𝜋𝐷
∗∗]
𝜕𝜎2
=
2(4 + 𝛾4)
(4 − 𝛾2)2
 > 0. 
 (4-32), (4-33), (4-34), (4-35), (4-36) 
 
Proof.  Given the assumption 𝑎 − 𝑐 > 𝛾(1 − 𝑐), the inequalities are satisfied. □ 
 
In this proposition, we also consider the demand uncertainty for the whole SC. As 
a simplification, we assume that 𝜎 = 𝜎𝐿 = 𝜎𝑆 . We differentiate these equilibrium 
outcomes with respect to the variance of demand uncertainty for the whole SC 𝜎2. Then, 
we find that as the variance of the demand uncertainty for the whole SC 𝜎2 increases, 
some of the outcomes increase in the equilibrium. In other words, from the proposition, 
we show that increasing demand uncertainty for the whole SC is desirable for the 
developer, consumer, and whole SC in our model. Moreover, our analysis confirms that 
each retailer has a contrasting movement with respect to the rent at the equilibrium in 
the benchmark model. However, as the extent of the demand uncertainty of both 
retailers increases, both take the same action at the equilibrium. 
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4.5. Concluding remarks 
In our extended model, we revealed the surprising phenomenon that this 
conclusion would be reversed in the situation with demand uncertainty. Specifically, 
although we found that the proportion of the fixed fee rent is higher for the large retailer 
than the small retailer in our benchmark model, the extended model found that the 
proportion of the fixed fee rent becomes greater for the small retailer. Moreover, 
regarding important factors such as the relation of the fixed fee rent between large and 
small retailers, we consider that a conclusion that some region are reversed is worth 
discussing in the paper. In this way, we obtained the amazing results that the 
benchmarks and results change with a simple comparison. Moreover, in our model, 
when the degree of demand uncertainty is the same in each retailer, the result obtained 
is consistent with the benchmark model. In other words, we found that the fixed fee 
rent increases only if a factor widens the difference in the degree of demand uncertainty 
between large and small retailers. 
Furthermore, by using the comparative static analysis, we analyzed what would 
happen when differentiated products become homogeneous products and the 
competition between large and small retailers becomes more intense in SCs. Then, if 
the retailers in SCs become even more competitive, it could decrease the profit of the 
developer. The benchmark model confirmed that the profit of the developer would 
decline as previously when approaching homogeneous products, it reduces the profit 
of the developer at the equilibrium. This is a general result. However, in our extended 
model, we discovered a counterintuitive result that the profit of the developer would 
increase under demand uncertainty in SCs. In other words, when the degree of product 
substitutability increases and similar retail tenants carry similar products in an SC, there 
is an increase in the profit of the developer. Then, amazingly, when the degree of 
demand uncertainty in the whole SC increases, the profit of the developer increases 
more at the equilibrium. Furthermore, we obtain similar results for social welfare under 
uncertainty at the equilibrium. This is one of the most interesting results in our extended 
model. In other words, we found that increasing demand uncertainty for the whole SC 
is desirable for the developer in our model. 
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Interestingly, our analysis shows that when uncertainty is expanded in SCs, that 
is, when a developer attracts a retailer with a high degree of demand uncertainty such 
as opening a new tenant or rolling out new products, selling a new product for new 
customers in SCs, it would be better for the developer to increase the proportion of the 
fixed fee rent. Moreover, from a managerial perspective, we found that the developer 
should attract the retailer with the demand uncertainty in the whole SC and similar 
retail tenants (e.g., tenants that sell similar quality products) to the SC. Furthermore, 
this paper makes a major contribution to the better management of the SC by indicating 
that when a developer opens an SC in areas where uncertainty is relatively high, it may 
be profitable for developers to attract retailers that produce a similar product to other 
retailers, have a similar consumer need, or sell a product that has a similar quality or 
value. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
This paper considers a vertical relationship in SCs with a developer and two types of 
retailers: a large retailer and small retailer. First, a developer decides the rent for each 
retailer. Then, each retailer decides the sales volume. There are two types of rent 
payments: one type is a fixed rent for a certain period of time and the other type is a 
rent determined by the sales of the retailer. We provide a game-theoretic model to 
discuss whether a developer gives preferential treatment to large or small retailers by 
assigning a higher percentage of the royalty rent or fixed fee rent to them. 
The main ﬁndings of this research are summarized as follows. First, when there 
are both large retailers and small retailers in one SC, the developer may attempt to make 
the competitive advantage of the small retailer stronger by improving the quantity of 
products, thereby intensifying the competition between the large and small retailers in 
the SC. However, in our model, the developer gives preferential treatment to large 
retailers rather than intensifying the competition among retailers by strengthening the 
competitive advantage of the small retailer at the equilibrium. In other words, we found 
that the developer chooses to make the large retailer even stronger and increase the 
sales volume of the large retailer by decreasing the royalty of rent of the large retailer 
in order to increase the profits of the developer. Then, the developer collects the rents 
with a greater ratio of the fixed fee rent from the large retailer and the rents with a 
greater ratio of the ad valorem royalty rent from the small retailer in SCs. Therefore, 
we explain the observed relationship in real-world SCs by using our theoretical model. 
Furthermore, in our extended model, we revealed the surprising phenomenon that 
this conclusion would be reversed in the situation with demand uncertainty. Specifically, 
although we found that the proportion of the fixed fee rent is higher for large retailers 
than for small retailers in our benchmark model, the extended model found that the 
proportion of the fixed fee rent becomes greater for the small retailer. Moreover, 
regarding important factors such as the relation of the fixed fee rent between large and 
small retailers, we consider that a conclusion that one region is reversed is worth 
discussing in the paper. In this way, we obtained the amazing results that the 
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benchmarks and results change with a simple comparison. Moreover, in our model, 
when the degree of demand uncertainty is the same in each retailer, we found that the 
result is consistent with the benchmark model. In other words, we found that the fixed 
fee rent increases only if a factor widens the difference in the degree of demand 
uncertainty between the large retailer and small retailer. 
In addition, under uncertainty, we found that when the demand uncertainty in the 
whole SC increases and market competition gradually becomes intense and approaches 
the competition of homogeneous products using the degree of product substitutability, 
the developer would increase the proportion of the fixed fee rent for both large and 
small retailers. Our analysis in the benchmark model confirmed that large and small 
retailers have a contrasting movement with respect to the proportion of the rent at the 
equilibrium. However, in the situation where the extent of the demand uncertainty of 
both retailers increases, we found that both large and small retailers take the same 
action in terms of the fixed fee rent of retailers at the equilibrium. 
Furthermore, by using the comparative static analysis, we analyzed what would 
happen when differentiated products become homogeneous products and the 
competition between retailers becomes more intense in SCs. Then, if the retailers in 
SCs become even more competitive, it could decrease the profit of the developer. The 
benchmark model confirmed that the profit of the developer would decline as 
previously when approaching homogeneous products, it reduces the profit of the 
developer at the equilibrium. This is a general result. However, in our extended model, 
we discovered a counterintuitive result that the profit of the developer would increase 
under uncertainty in SCs. In other words, when the degree of product substitutability 
increases and similar retail tenants carry similar products in an SC, there is an increase 
in the profit of the developer. Then, when the degree of demand uncertainty in the 
whole SC increases, the profit of the developer increases more at the equilibrium. In 
other words, from the proposition, surprisingly, we found that increasing demand 
uncertainty for the whole SC is desirable for the developer in our model. Furthermore, 
we obtained similar results for social welfare under uncertainty at the equilibrium. This 
is one of the most interesting results in our extended model. 
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The contribution of this research is that we clarified the relationships among the 
variables that can be observed in reality in an SC by using the theoretical model. In 
addition, we obtained theoretical evidence that confirms the findings of previous 
empirical studies. In previous studies, the developer gives preferential treatment to 
large retailers (Benjamin et al. 1992; Brueckner 1993; Eppli and Shilling 1996; Gould 
et al. 2005; Miceli et al. 1998; Pashigian and Gould 1998; Wheaton 2000). Much of 
this previous literature has focused on the rent system of the per unit royalty, and hence 
studies of the ad valorem royalty with two-part tariffs have received relatively less 
attention. The result of our paper is novel for building a theoretical model using revenue 
sharing, called the ad valorem royalty rent system, which is commonly used in practice 
in SCs. 
Furthermore, in the context of SCs, prior research has paid insufficient attention 
to the theoretical relationship between the proportion of the two rent systems (ad 
valorem royalty and fixed fee rent) for large and small retailers and the profits of 
developers. In addition, insufficient discussion has been carried out on the changes in 
the proportion of the fixed fee rent and ad valorem royalty rent between large and small 
retailers and in the profits of developers by considering the degree of product 
substitutability and demand uncertainty in the context of SCs. Additionally, no 
argument has been made on the degree of the difference in uncertainty between the two 
types of retailers at the same time. Therefore, this paper can explain the observed 
relationship in reality by using factors not used in previous studies. This paper 
contributes to the literature by pointing out the importance of considering competitive 
relations due to the change in the degree of product substitutability between large and 
small retailers and of considering the uncertainty of customer demand in SCs in the real 
world. 
Interestingly, our analysis showed that when uncertainty is expanded in SCs, that 
is, when a developer attracts a retailer with a high degree of demand uncertainty such 
as opening a new tenant or rolling out new products, selling a new product for new 
customers in SCs, it would be better for the developer to increase the proportion of the 
fixed fee rent. Moreover, from a managerial perspective, we found that the developer 
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should attract the retailer with the demand uncertainty in the whole SC and similar 
retail tenants (e.g., tenants that sell similar quality products) to the SC. Furthermore, 
this paper makes a major contribution to the better management of SCs by indicating 
that when a developer opens an SC in areas where demand uncertainty is relatively 
high, it may be profitable for developers to attract retailers that produce a similar 
product to other retailers, have a similar consumer need, or sell a product that has a 
similar quality or value. 
In this study, since we assume a duopoly market and have not addressed the 
general number of companies, these extensions—that appear to be possible in the case 
of maintaining the linear assumption—will be important. In addition, we consider the 
situation where the marginal costs of retailers are the same in our model. Specifically, 
we explain what kind of situation this assumes. We consider the situation that the 
willingness to pay of consumers changes depending on the differences in retail brands 
and brand image. In that case, it is a natural setting to assume little difference between 
the goods used by retailers and there is no difference in the marginal cost. We 
considered the situation where the marginal costs of retailers are the same in our model. 
However, once we consider the results may change if the marginal cost of each retailer 
is different. From the model, as the large retailer sells goods with a higher willingness 
to pay than the small retailer, it can be considered to be sufficient to assume that the 
large retailer has a higher marginal cost than the small retailer.  
For example, when the marginal cost of the large retailer rises, the developer may 
not increase this marginal cost of the large retailer anymore, so the royalty of the large 
retailer at the equilibrium may be lowered. Then, as the marginal cost of the large 
retailer increases, the sales volume of large retailer may decrease, while the sales 
volume of the small retailer may increase because of the strategic substitution effect. 
Then, the developer will increase the marginal cost of the small retailer. As a result, 
considering the relationship of the royalties of both large and small retailers, we can 
infer that the difference in royalties between these retailers will expand more than in 
our model. In other words, since the proposition of the relationship of royalties in this 
model is maintained without dividing the marginal cost, the proposition in our model 
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is a robust conclusion in that sense. However, as it may be possible to analyze by 
reversing the assumption of the relation of the marginal cost, we would like to make 
this a future subject. 
Moreover, in our model, we assumed two retailers competing in a market as 
Cournot duopolists with horizontally differentiated products. First, since Cournot 
competition was analyzed by Martín and Saracho (2016) and Creane and Miyagiwa 
(2008), we adopted Cournot competition. As mentioned earlier, in the field of two-part 
tariffs underlying the theory of our model, it is a novelty that we adopt the ad valorem 
royalty instead of the per unit royalty. Since quantities are important in the per unit 
royalty, we analyze Cournot competition in this research to compare it with previous 
research. However, it is also a future research direction to analyze Bertrand competition. 
Hence, the model constructed in this study could be developed in future research. 
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